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In t roduct ion 
Th is  p a p e r  is b a s e d  o n  a n  interpretat ive s tudy o f a n  e n tire m a n a g e m e n t e a m  wi th in a  s ing le  
c o m p a n y . It exam ines  th e  factors such  as  th e  va lues,  exper ience ,  a n d  behav iou rs  o f n e w  
m a n a g e r s  wi th in th e  c o m p a n y  wh ich  in f luenced the i r  ass imi lat ion,  a n d  th u s  a ffec ted  th e  
e ffec t iveness o f th e  o rgan isa t ion  a t a  par t icu lar  m o m e n t in  tim e . In  th is  case  th e  firm  h a d  a  
n e w  chief  execu tive w h o  was  a tte m p tin g  to  re- focus th e  c o m p a n y ’s strategic posi t ion,  a n d  
n e w  staff we re  i n tended  to  b e  a  ma jo r  lever  wi th wh ich  to  e ffect  c h a n g e . Howeve r , it was  
w ide ly  pe rce ived  th a t s o m e  o f th e  n e w  m a n a g e r s  we re  less successfu l  in  th is  th a n  th e y  
m ight  h a v e  b e e n . Th is  p a p e r  the re fo re  repor ts  o n  th e  factors wh ich  a p p e a r e d  to  c o n tr ibute 
to  the i r  re lat ive fa i lure.  
Theo re tical b a c k g r o u n d  
This  s tudy c rosses a  n u m b e r  o f th e o r e tical bounda r i es  a n d  d raws  u p o n  a  n u m b e r  o f bod ies  
o f l i terature, inc lud ing  th o s e  wh ich  h a v e  e x a m i n e d  th e  personal i t ies  a n d  behav iou r  o f 
m a n a g e r s  a n d  latterly re la ted th e s e  to  th e  strategic c o n tingenc ies  o f th e  organ isat ion.  
Resea rch  in  th e  a rea  o f m a n a g e m e n t a n d  leadersh ip  h a s  a  l ong  a n d  w ide - rang ing  history. 
Th is  c a n  b road ly  b e  d iv ided  into th a t wh ich  i den tifies  th e  personal i ty  character ist ics o f 
m a n a g e r s , (Ka ish  a n d  G i lad 1 9 9 1 ; G inn  a n d  S e x to n  1 9 9 0 ; M iner  1 9 9 0 ) ; to  w h a t m a n a g e r s  
actual ly  d o  ( K o tte r  1 9 8 2 ; M in tzberg  1 9 7 3 ) , o r  w h a t behav iou rs  l ead  to  manage r i a l  success,  
o fte n  m e a n i n g  th e  s u b s e q u e n t ca reer  success  o f th e  ind iv idua l  conce rned  (Cocker i l l  1 9 8 9 ; 
B o y a tzis 1 9 8 2 ; C a m p b e l l  e t a l  1 9 7 0 ) . Howeve r , the re  h a s  b e e n  deve lop ing  crit icism  o f 
research  wh ich  h a s  l ooked  a t personal i ty  character ist ics wi thout  tak ing  a c c o u n t o f th e  
c o n text in  wh ich  par t icu lar  character ist ics m a y  b e  he lp fu l  (Kraut  e t a l  1 9 8 9 ) . M a n y  o f th e s e  
character ist ics,  fo r  e x a m p l e  in terna l  locus  o f c o n trol o r  n e e d  fo r  a c h i e v e m e n t (Sex ton  a n d  
B o w m a n  1 9 8 5 ) , o r  intu i t ion (Ago r  1 9 8 4 )  c a n  b e  fo u n d  across  a  w ide  var iety o f o rgan isa t ion  
set t ings o r  ro les.  B e c a u s e  o f th is  g a p  it a p p e a r s  to  b e  increas ing ly  r e c o m m e n d e d  th a t 
p rocesses  (Cornwa l l  a n d  P e r l m a n  1 9 9 0 ; K a n ter  1 9 8 9 )  o r  h o w  behav iou r  in f luences 
pe r fo rmance  (Sex ton  a n d  B o w m a n  1 9 8 5 ; G ibb  a n d  Dav ies  1 9 9 0 )  shou ld  b e  th e  focus  fo r  
research  ra ther  th a n  manage r i a l  character ist ics in  isolat ion.  
A large list of managerial tasks or behaviours has similarly been identified (Mintzberg 
1973; Nystrom and Starbuck 1981; Kotter 1982). Some of this stream of research has also 
attempted to link such behaviours with managerial effectiveness (for example Campbell et 
al 1970). The ability to motivate staff, to build teams, to delegate, to plan and set direction, 
to evaluate, to take decisions, to communicate, to recognise and solve problems, to 
understand finance, to manage costs, and to work hard have all been cited as important 
managerial functions (Gibb 1987, Bird 1988, Olson 1987). This body of work has recently 
been developed into models of generic management competences, which combine both 
behavioural and personality elements. An example is provided by Elkin (1990), where such 
competences are gathered into four main groups (figure 1) 
Insert figure 1 about here 
However, such models pay little attention to the processes or context whereby such 
competences are effective, and as with personality characteristics, the attempt to identify 
generic skills without regard for situation has seen increasing criticism (Gibb and Davies 
1990, Varadarajan And Ramanujam 1990). There appears to be a growing awareness that 
the context of the organisation’s culture, and economic environment, as well as managerial 
level all have to be taken into account when identifying appropriate managerial 
characteristics or behaviour (Guthrie and Olian 1991; Kraut et al 1989). 
These criticisms of the failure to take context into account when examining managerial 
effectiveness have been further developed by those who advocate contingent linkages 
between the strategic orientation of the organisation, and the required leadership or 
managerial characteristics or behaviour needed to successfully implement it. Many of these 
studies have concentrated on the relationship between demographic characteristics such as 
age or industry experience and strategic preferences, rather than behaviour or personality 
(Guthrie et al 1991; Gupta 1984; Child 1974), and few have attempted to look at the means 
whereby such characteristics influence strategic decision making. Pettigrew (1992) for 
example suggests that the stream of demography research has been weakened by the fact 
that “no-one has ever been near a top team in an organisational setting either to directly 
observe a team in action, or to interview the members about the links between their 
characteristics and structure, processes of communication and decision-making and their 
impact and performance”. However, some research under the strategic contingency 
framework has looked at industry or company experience. Many have commented on the 
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b e n e fits th a t “n e w  b l o o d ” c a n  b r ing  to  a  c o m p a n y  (Hofer  1 9 8 2 ; C h a g a n ti a n d  S a m b h a r y a  
1 9 8 7 ,; S a th e  1 9 8 9 ; A l lcorn 1 9 9 0 ) . A  n e w  chief  execu tive f rom o u ts ide th e  c o m p a n y  
ind icates th a t a  c h a n g e  o f strategy, o f w h a tever  n a ture,  is l ikely to  fo l low,  o fte n  as  th e  resul t  
o f poo r  o rgan isa t iona l  pe r fo rmance  pr ior  to  th e  c h a n g e  (Hofer  1 9 8 2 ; G u thr ie  a n d  O l ian 
1 9 9 1 ) . Howeve r , a l t hough  th e  cor re la t ion b e tween  c h a n g e  o f chief  execu tive a n d  strategy is 
c o m p a r a tively wel l  d o c u m e n te d  (for e x a m p l e  W ie rsema a n d  B a n te l  1 9 9 2 ) , fewe r  s tud ies 
h a v e  l ooked  a t th e  m e c h a n i s m s  whe reby  par t icu lar  a ttr ibutes s u b s e q u e n tly in f luence th e  
i m p l e m e n ta tio n  o f strategy, par t icu lar ly  w h e r e  th is  is n e w  to  th e  organ isat ion.  A t th is  tim e , 
th e  o rgan isa t ion  is l ikely to  b e  in  a  state o f cons ide rab le  uncer ta in ty  i den tifie d  in  m a n y  o f 
th e  c o m p a n y  l i fe-cycle m o d e l s  (for e x a m p l e  J o h n s o n  1 9 9 2 ) . U n d e r  th e s e  c i rcumstances 
th e  requ i red  a ttr ibutes o f m a n a g e r s  m a y  b e  very  di f ferent f rom th o s e  in  c o m p a n i e s  wh ich  
a re  in  a  state o f strategic stabil i ty. 
M a n y  (for e x a m p l e  Hassa rd  a n d  Shar i f i  1 9 8 9 )  h a v e  a lso  c o m m e n te d  o n  th e  diff iculty o f 
ach iev ing  cul tura l  c h a n g e . W h e n  n e w  sen io r  execu t ives try to  m a k e  m o d i f icat ions, th e y  
d iscover  s t rong b o n d s  wi th in th e  o rgan isa t ion  wh ich  reject  n e w  init iat ives. Thus  th e  u s e  o f 
p o w e r , by  m e a n s  o f c o n tin g e n t behav iou rs  such  as  th e  ruth less remova l  o f un-suppor t i ve  
staff, a n d  th e  subst i tute o f s y m p a th isers  m a y  b e  a n  impor tant  behav iour .  C h a n g i n g  staff 
m a y  h a v e  th e  e ffect  o f re in forc ing th e  o rgan isa t ion’s n e w  ideo logy  th r o u g h  th e  se lect ion o f 
pe rsonne l  w h o  wi l l  suppo r t th e  n e w  direct ion,  In  add i tio n  th e  u s e  o f ind iv idua ls  w h o  h a d  
b e e n  suppo r ters  o f th e  o ld  reg imes  a n d  h a v e  conver ted  b e c o m e  p o w e r fu l  symbo ls  o f 
c h a n g e . Those  w h o  d o  n o t subscr ibe  to  th e  n e w  ways  m u s t b e  r e m o v e d  or  o m i tte d  f rom th e  
dec is ion -mak ing  p rocesses  ( Johnson  1 9 8 4 ) . In  th is  way  recrui tment ,  p r o m o tio n , a n d  
d ismissa ls  b e c o m e  impor tant  symbo l ic  act ions o f c o m m i tm e n t to  th e  strategy. Howeve r , 
a l t hough  th is  aspec t o f manage r i a l  behav iou r  h a s  intui t ive a p p e a l  a n d  h a s  b e e n  d o c u m e n te d  
prev ious ly  (by  fo r  e x a m p l e  P fe ffe r  1 9 8 2  a n d  M in tzberg 1 9 8 3 ) , it h a s  b e e n  subject  to  
c o m p a r a tively little research.  For  e x a m p l e , it is n o t k n o w n  o n  w h a t bas is  th e s e  ind iv idua ls  
a re  se lected,  w h a t m a k e s  such  a  po l icy  e ffect ive, o r  th e  p rocesses  whe reby  such  act ions 
m a y  in f luence c h a n g e  th r o u g h  th e  e ffect  th a t it h a s  o n  o the r  o rgan isa t ion  m e m b e r s . 
O n e  g a p , fo r  e x a m p l e , a p p e a r s  to  b e  in  ou r  unde rs ta n d i n g  o f th e  se lect ion o f n e w  staff 
acco rd ing  to  the i r  abi l i ty to  deve lop  re la t ionsh ips  wi th o the rs  in  o rde r  to  a l low th e  
o rgan isa t ion  to  c o n tin u e  to  o p e r a te  as  a  te a m . T h e  p rocesses  by  wh ich  a ttr ibutes, such  as  
exper ience ,  behav iou rs  o r  va lues,  a l low th e  ass imi la t ion o f n e w  m e m b e r s  into th e  
o rgan isa t ion  a re  little unde rs to o d . S tud ies  * into te a m  processes,  fo r  e x a m p l e , h a v e  te n d e d  to  
c o n c e n trate o n  smal l  task  g roups  in  art i f icial s i tuat ions a n d  n o t o n  o rgan isa t ions  as  a  w h o l e  
(T josvo ld  1 9 9 1 ) . S imi lar ly,  th e  la rge  v o l u m e  o f research  into recru i tment  h a s  te n d e d  to  
focus  o n  th e  techn iques  o f recru i tment  (Her-r iot  1 9 8 9 )  o r  th e  s u b s e q u e n t ca reer  success  o f 
th e  ind iv idua l  (Be rgwerk  1 9 8 8 )  ra ther  th a n  o n  th e  p rocesses  wh ich  faci l i tate th e  accep ta n c e  
of the newcomer into the specific organisational context, or the motives behind managerial 
selection decisions (Bergwerk 1988; Guthrie et al 1991; Guthrie and Olian 1991). For 
example, one way in which individuals may be chosen is if they are perceived to share the 
same value systems as their chief executive, thus allowing change to be introduced within a 
framework of trust (Starbuck and Milliken 1988). However, where such value systems are 
out of line with those already existing in the organisation, which is perhaps inevitable where 
change is being contemplated, particular care may need to be taken, a different outcome 
may result. 
Methodological background 
Research Objectives 
Although there are clearly large, but in general segregated, bodies of literature on 
managerial characteristics, groups, the management of change, and staffing practices, there 
has been very little research which attempts to integrate these fields and examine how 
particular attributes of managers contribute to organisational performance under particular 
circumstances. The objective of this research therefore has been to understand and explain 
how the attributes of new managers influenced the implementation of an organisation’s 
strategy at the time when it was attempting to achieve a significant change of direction. 
The aim was to understand and explore the issues which managers themselves viewed as 
important, and which they believed had influenced the effectiveness of their company, and 
to learn from the understanding and experiences of the managers themselves. 
The nature of this question, and the desire to incorporate the complexity of a whole 
organisation, led to the choice of an interpretative study of a complete management team. 
Methodology - 
The methodology selected was guided by the need to be able to cope with the complexity of 
organisational and economic contingencies, and surface the issues which were meaningful 
to the subjects themselves rather than the researcher. In addition, subjective matters such 
as relationships and perceptions as to a colleague’s competence appeared to be 
inappropriate issues for the reductionist format of a questionnaire. As a result an interactive 
and interpretative methodology was chosen instead which examined a single organisation 
from a multi-source perspective. Given this framework, semi-structured interviews 
appeared to offer the best opportunity of exploring the core issues of interest to the 
researcher, which was how particular managerial attributes were perceived to have 
contributed to the organisation’s performance, whilst allowing the flexibility for additional 
aspects which were particularly important to the managers themselves to emerge. Certain 
information was obtained from all interviewees. This was:- a) personal details, including 
qualifications and work background; b) the interviewee’s understanding of the 
organisation’s strategic position, and if or how this had changed recently, and their role in 
contributing to this; c) the interviewee’s understanding of who had been successful within 
the company and why, and vice versa; d) how the interviewee would go about obtaining 
and managing the type of person he or she believed would contribute to the organisation’s 
success; and e) how the interviewee would deal with problem staff. In time, as particular 
people and particular situations emerged as especially important, these were explored in 
more detail. 
Thirty managers from the main subject company were interviewed between November 1992 
- July 1993, and contact has been maintained with several managers since that time. These 
individuals represented all the senior managers of the company. All the interviews were 
taped and transcribed. The interview data were supplemented by direct observation, as all 
meetings took place in the interviewees offices, and by documents, such as personnel 
records, in-house communications, and company reports and accounts, both internal and 
published. These data, in addition to data from the pilot study companies, were analysed 
and theoretical propositions derived by means of Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) model of 
grounded theory development. 
Organisation background 
The company chosen, a British PLC, was selected because it had a comparatively 
straightforward organisation and ownership structure; it had a fairly conventional hierarchy 
of supervisors, middle and senior managers, and top team of directors, and it was in public 
ownership. The company had an average of about one thousand employees at the time of 
the research. In addition, it offered the opportunity to evaluate a programme of strategic 
change at the time it was happening, although one draw-back to this was that the 
performance outcome of the company was uncertain at the time of data-collection. The 
company had an unstable recent history. This included a merger with another equally- 
sized company by which means the product ranges of both companies were intended to be 
complemented and extended. The company’s principal operations are the supply and 
installation of environmental quality-maintenance equipment which are sold mainly into 
the UK construction and manufacturing industries. More precise details cannot be given as 
they would identify ,the company which wishes to remain anonymous. Although its sales 
are mainly UK based, it had a small number of operations abroad and has expanded into the 
former communist countries of Eastern Europe. Sales of most products are through a 
national network of depots. 
In addition to the problems of the merger, many of the company’s old products were 
believed to have reached the end of their life-cycles and had ceased to be appropriate for 
the new types of factories or offices which were being built. Over recent years replacement 
products had not been developed in enough time to compensate for their decline. A 
widespread belief of the managers interviewed that both the old companies independently 
would have struggled to compete during the early 1990s even without the added 
complication of the merger. These problems were exacerbated by the severe economic 
recession which affected the markets in which the company operated. Virtually all 
commercial organisations within the construction and manufacturing industries suffered, 
and companies servicing these sectors, as the subject company did, were particularly badly 
affected. 
As a result of perceived poor management decisions at the end of the 198Os, relating to the 
merger and the immediate post-merger period, the company had brought in a new chief 
executive. He had instigated a major programme of change across the whole organisation. 
Since his arrival he had instigated modifications to the company’s structure, systems and 
strategy. He had also made new appointm&s to the positions of marketing, human 
resources, and operations directors, and had replaced a large number of other managers. At 
the start of the research period he was expressing the view that the company was now in a 
position to go forward, and was adopting objectives of growth through product and market 
development. These were to be measured in terms of profits, turnover and market 
positioning. The firm’s relative performance proved impossible to judge and making 
comparisons was not feasible. No other firm operated in exactly the same range of markets 
or was affected by the same circumstances, a point made forcibly by McDonald (1982), 
who states that all organisations are unique. Nevertheless, in order to provide some 
comparative data, grouped figures are provided from other companies in similar markets 
(figure 2). 
Insert figure 2 about here 
However, most of the managers interviewed felt that the company had not done as well as it 
should have done, and internal factors contributed to its poor performance. These are the 
subject of the discussion below. 
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Development of grounded theory categories 
b-~ the very precise way laid out by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and particularly by Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) conceptual categories were developed, and linkages between the 
categories and the context under which such categories or linkages occurred were 
identified. This was done by means of a coding paradigm in which the conditions, context, 
strategies and actions undertaken in relation to the category, and resulting consequences 
were stated. Hence it was possible to establish the situation in which a particular 
managerial attribute or behaviour was effective; the context in which it was found, the 
ways in which managers or the company encouraged its use, and the consequences of its 
presence or absence. This process was undertaken on each category in turn and theoretical 
propositions developed. 
The process of labelling categories began at an early stage in data collection, during which 
ideas about phenomena were developed. An initial analysis of the data yielded over 1500 
categories. Over time, some of these began to emerge as more significant than others. 
These were then refined in an iterative process; some categories were discarded, and others 
re-defined, a process which Glaser and Strauss term saturation. This resulted in a total of 
forty categories and category groups (figure 3). 
Insert figure 3 about here 
A number of these categories were more central to the developing theory than others, and 
relationships between them were often highly complex. For example ruthlessness was not 
only a helpful behaviour in its own right leading to control, it was also an important factor 
in the relationships and coalitions category. Shared values concerning ruthlessness 
influenced the acceptability of the individual to his or her colleagues within the specific 
context of this organisation. This in its turn impacted on team development, all of which 
related to the organisation’s effectiveness category. The staffing category group also 
emerged as an important one, which was linked to many others, and which highlighted the 
effects of the numbers of changes to staff which had taken place in the company recently. 
Recruitment related to learning curves and transferability of experience, and thus to the . 
competence and credibility categories. Another important relationship was that between 
recruitment, competence, dismissal and ruthlessness, an important attribute when the 
previous experience of new recruits appeared not to be easily transferable. This was 
perceived to be a major contributory factor to the firm’s poor performance, particularly 
when such staff were allowed to remain in key roles. 
It is a basic requirement of this methodology that single illustrations of phenomena are not 
accepted as theoretically significant; instead multiple examples have to be provided before 
a category can be considered meaningful. Negative cases are deliberately sought, in order 
to clarify and refine the central concepts of the category and to specify exceptions or 
contexts which might influence it. By these means, it is possible to specify the situations 
under which phenomena exist, a process which Glascr and Strauss tern1 a conditional path. 
Theoretical propositions derived by such means can be posited to apply to other situations 
in which similar conditions are found and generalisability can thus be extended to a greater 
degree than in more conventional qualitative methodologies. However, the construction of 
such propositions, as with any research within the interpreti\*ist persepective, can be 
considered no more than a personal, albeit empirically-derived, explanation of the 
circumstances as described by the managers themselves. 
Summary of data 
This section summarises the relevant case study data. No attempt is made to integrate this 
with findings from previous research at this stage; instead this is carried out in the 
subsequent section. 
One of the contingencies underlying this company was a highly unsettled situation resulting 
from poor management prior to the arrival of the present senior management team. The 
previous directors were almost unanimously perceived to have failed to deal adequately 
with the integration of the merger several years previously, or to clearly define the strategic 
direction that the company should take. The circumstances facing the new team as a result 
were a disaffected, highly political staff, little consensus as to the company’s future, 
considerable strategic uncertainty and high levels of anxiety throughout the organisation. 
Given this background, a major cultural and strategic change programme was considered 
necessary to remedy these problems. Much of this had been achieved prior to this study 
commencing. In this process a large number of managers had been dismissed, and 
replacements brought in from other companies including a high proportion from the chief 
executive’s former company. New managers were considered ‘to be a major lever with 
which to effect change by the chief executive:- 
“Its a case of talent spotting, getting the right top team in 
place, getting key managers on board. Now that again results 
in what I call the pecking order being altered and all sorts of 
sub-systems and values being tscklcd.” 
This view accords with those who suggest that incrcascd imov;ltion, fresh ideas, greater 
creativity and a general orientation towards growth and dcvclopmcnt will result from new 
management blood. In the case company, thcsc views find mixed support. Some new 
managers certainly brought about change; the chief executive and human resources director 
had successfully implemented new structures and systems and were adopting an innovative 
strategic posture. However, a considerable proportion of new managers were perceived to 
have failed to successfully contribute to the company’s performance. This resulted from 
several apparent mechanisms:- lack of competence due to inexperience and the 
unpredictability of recruitment; lack of common values with those already existing in the 
company; lack of time for co-operative relationships to have developed; and the need for 
particular competcnces given these specific contingencies. These four aspects emerged as 
key categories from analysis of the data and were central to a number of conditional paths 
or relationships between categories, and are dealt with below. 
a) Experience and resulting competence 
As a result of the perceptions of the new chief c.secutivc as to the quality of existing staff in 
the company, he had made a number of key managerial appointments. Many of these he 
had known of, or known personally in the past as they were collcagues from his former 
company. Although there were different views as to his motives for these appointments, 
such as the need to surround himself with trusted acolytes, others supported his own stated 
motives which were to bring in high quality people with previously successful track 
records. Despite these good intentions many of these appointments were unsuccessful. 
Lack of competence in those making the selection decisions, or a simple reflection of a 
normal failure rate in recruitment were both stated as potential explanations Some 
managers were aware of this problem:- 
“If you’ve got someone on board and in honesty feeling that 
you’ve got the right person for the job, its only when you get 
them in the damned position that you really find out what 
they’re like .” . 
Others, and this included the chief executive, appeared less aware of this potential problem 
and a large number of new appointments were made. Many managers thought that this 
problem applied at the most senior levels. The lack of industry knowledge of the chief 
executive, and at least two of his fellow directors, was widely bclicved to have contributed 
to what many belie\red to be fundamental strategic mistakes. One of these was the decision 
to persist with a policy of making staff generalists across all product groups. The 
company’s main products were in their own distinct markets, and sales and maintenance 
procedures were carried out in very different ways:- 
“He came from an operation that sold boxes, it was moving 
boxes around. Our business is a very different animal and this 
is the thing that they were all caught by.” 
The finance director was also comparatively new to the company, although he believed that 
his skills were transferable across industries. By no means everyone agreed with this, and 
he had been criticised along with the chief executive for his lack of product and industry 
knowledge. For example, his lack of expericncc of the specific sales techniques of the 
company, which relied heavily on local knowledge and individually negotiated deals, was 
seen to have contributed to his insistence on centrally-controlled and rigid profitability 
levels. Field managers felt that this had undermined their ability to respond to individual 
customer need, and sales had been lost. ln support of their views that these policies had 
been unhelpful, managers cited the fact that such policies had eventually been returned to 
their original positions. In the meantime, the company’s performance suffered. 
Lack of experience appeared to be crucial in other key roles too, for example marketing. 
Two senior executives in this area, including the director, were also new to the company. 
In addition to advertising and branding decisions which were widely criticised on the basis 
of their inappropriateness for the company’s market characteristics, the marketing director’s 
lack of experience appeared to affect his ability to assess the performance of staff within his 
control:- 
“He had got a couple of guys over there, neither of them were 
very good and have since been removed or relocated, and he 
hadn’t got enough experience or knowledge himself of the 
product to decide which one of them right so no decisions 
were ever made and the few that were made were wrongs. ” 
As many of those with least experience of the organisation and its products were in key 
roles, their previous experience in industries with \rery different characteristics appeared to 
lead to decisions which were critical to the organisation’s performance and which were 
subsequently heavily criticised by those with more experience within the company. The 
lack of knowledge of the company’s characteristics on the part of the chief executive 
appeared in itself to have contributed to the decision to bring in a large number of 
executive, and at least two of his fellow directors, was widely believed to have contributed 
to what many believed to be fundamental strategic mistakes. One of these was the decision 
to persist with a policy of making staff gcncralists across all product groups. The 
company’s main products were in their own distinct markets, and salts and maintenance 
procedures were carried out in very different ways:- 
“He came from an operation that sold boxes, it was moving 
boxes around. Our business is a \‘cry different animal and this 
is the thing that they were all caught by.” 
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The finance director was also comparatively new to the company, although he believed that 
his skills were transferable across industries. By no means everyone agreed with this, and 
he had been criticised along with the chief executive for his lack of product and industry 
knowledge. For example, his lack of experience of the specific sales techniques of the 
company, which relied heavily on local knowledge and individually negotiated deals, was 
seen to have contributed to his insistence on centrally-controlled and rigid profitability 
levels. Field managers felt that this had undermined their ability to respond to individual 
customer need, and sales had been lost. In support of their views that these policies had 
been unhelpful, managers cited the fact that such policies had eventually been returned to 
their original positions. In the meantime, the comp~ly’s performance suffered. 
Lack of experience appeared to be crucial in other key roles too, for example marketing. 
Two senior executives in this area, including the director, were also new to the company. 
In addition to advertising and branding decisions which were widely criticised on the basis 
of their inappropriateness for the company’s market characteristics, the marketing director’s 
lack of experience appeared to affect his ability to assess the performance of staff within his 
control:- 
“He had got a couple of guys oi/er there, neither of them were 
very good and have since been removed or relocated, and he 
hadn’t got enough experience or knowledge himself of the 
product to decide which one of them right so no decisions 
were ever made and the few that were made were wrongs. ” 
As many of those with least experience of the organisation and its products were in key 
roles, their previous experience in industries with very different characteristics appeared to 
lead to decisions which were critical to the organisation’s performance and which were 
subsequently heavily criticised by those with more experience within the company. The 
lack of knowledge of the company’s characteristics on the part of the chief executive 
appeared in itself to have contributed to the decision to bring in a large number of 
newcomers. One manager who was generally supportive nevertheless felt that the lack of 
experience had been a problem:- 
“He took a lot of the expertise out. I think it was done before 
he spent enough time to undcrsrand what the function of these 
people actually was, and why h;lppcncd was a hell of a lot of 
experienced people were removed in key positions.” 
This therefore highlights the paradox of new management and new experience being able to 
introduce change, whilst at the same time Iackin, u the industry-specific knowledge which 
would make such change appropriate. 
b) Common values 
One of the reasons why there had been a large number of changes to staff was because of 
the perceived quality of the existing staff. Many wcrc seen to be locked into inefficient or 
old-fashioned ways of working. Others appcarcd to be still at war with staff from the other 
side of the merged company a problem which the previous management had conspicuously 
failed to deal with. In an attempt to impose a new common purpose, and unite the disparate 
factions, those who were unwilling or unable to accept the changes were removed. 
Although competence was certainly a consideration in making staffing decisions, “fit” 
appeared to be emphasised more. Many of those who were dismissed or made redundant 
left because they had the wrong attitudes or \*alues given the new direction that the 
company wished to take. However, the choice of selecting people principally for “fit” again 
had unhelpful consequences in terms of loss of product and market knowledge. 
“A lot of the people who were chosen for redundancy actually 
went because they had the wrong attitudes but we threw out 
the baby with the bath water. We lost a lot of people with 
experience and skills.” 
One source of people with known common values were those with whom the chief 
executive had worked in the past, and a lrtrge proportion of the new management 
appointments, including the marketing director, came from his previous company. As 
suggested above, this was in part because they had a known track record, however, this 
policy also ensured that he was surrounded by people that he knew he could trust. Given 
the politics and lack of team spirit in the company that he inherited, this was seen by some 
to be an understandable response. However, it became problematic:- 
“There was a huge wai’c of rcsisrance to newcomers. 
Jealousy in my view. I’ve seen it before, but not to such a 
savage degree hcrc actually.” 
Others thought that this resistance was justificcl:- 
“I don’t know but they all came on board at a rime when the 
number of employees should hti\,e been decreasing and there 
were people coming in and thcrc was questions asked well 
why did he need that person 10 do this ptirticular job.” 
Many of these recruits were belicvcd to be less compctcnt than those they had replaced. As 
a result of this, and the apparent reluctance of rhe chief executive IO deal with his former 
colleagues who were not as competent as they nccdcd to bc, this coalition was seen to be a 
favoured sub-group in which poor performance was not dealt with in the same way as in 
other cases. Resistance to the newcomers built up, and pressure was brought to bear to 
have many of them removed, adding to the instability which had characterised the company 
over recent times. 
c) disruptions to relationships 
One result of the staffing changes was rhc breaking of existing and well-established 
relationships, and the time taken for trust and liking TO build up before new ones could be 
effective:- 
“It’s also inevitable that when you mo\*e into a different office 
or a different environment then it takes time to build your 
team up to get the team to undcrsrand how you work, how you 
want them to work, what work you expect them to do. It does 
take time to build it and trust very ofren only comes with time. 
You don’t trust somebody straight:tway.” 
This need to build teams and develop trust applied at the most senior level. The chief 
executive, on his arrival in the company, did not ha~‘e an existing team around him. He had 
inherited a number of senior managers, none of whom he had known previously and none of 
whom had been appointed by him. On arrii4 hi: held made efforts to build around him a 
senior management team with the skills and characteristics which he believed were 
necessary at the time. However, with only the marketing director did the chief executive 
have a prior relationship on which mutual trust could be based. As this individual was at 
the centre of subsequent criticisms for his lack of cspcricnce and resulting competence, this 
relationship proved problematic. O\~erall, the new top team in itself had no established 
sense of common purpose, or ability to discuss difficult or contentious issues within a basic 
framework of trust. This affected the chief csccuti\,e’s ability to hear criticisms of the 
performance of his collcague, and therefore Ike ;lction on him. 
The ability to deal with less than colnpetenr staff w;~ another problem which resulted from 
the new managerial appointments. In reccnr rimes ;1 considcrablc proportion of managers 
were making fresh assessments about the srrcngths and weaknesses of rheir own staff. This 
resulted in delays to problem people being dealt with:- 
“Anyway what happened then is, he would have gone before 
now but things change. My opposite number in the south 
went, the structure changed and the LLI‘C~S were created, 
Martin was promored to area manager. I flagged up my 
concerns to Martin about Tim and he said “I don’t want to 
know 1’11 form my own opinion” which is fine, it’s as it should 
be.” 
However, this resulted in problem members of srtlff remaining in place longer than if the 
managerial relationship had not been disrupted. If such individuals were in key roles, such 
as the product development managers, s~llcs 2nd profits were lost throughout the whole 
company. Product divisions were responsible t’or new product de\~clopment, and also for 
training and support functions, such as the repair of esisting products. Logistics problems 
in the supply of parts or complete products w the drpors as a result of the low standards of 
these managers meant that sales were lost, or qucllity of service was lower than expected. 
Communication chamiels between those who were aware of customer needs and those 
responsible for product development MU blocked, and real inno\,ative activity in these 
product divisions was also blocked. 
In addition, disruptions to relationships had also affected the company’s commercial 
performance in a number of other ways. Knowledge of customer requirements, in-house 
communications channels and other systems, and the sharing of ideas about product 
applications had all been damaged whilst new relationships took time to develop. Co- 
operation across depots had also been a problem affecting stock usage and customer service 
levels, a situation which had only recently bee11 rcsol\,ed:- 
“1 think there were a lot of cases where depots were working 
against each other at times. They wouldn’t let a product go 
because they might need it tomorrow. But the relationship of 
the area managers togcthcr has been lifted. We 311 know 
we’re on a comnioii course. If 1’111 sitting in the same room as 
Stcvc and I’m in trouble on this call. he’ll help INC out. 1’11 sa) 
yes, by all means bccausc 1 k11ow the prc~blcm and the 
situation he’s in and know if its the other way round, 1 could 
rely on him to help me out.” 
d) Contingent behaviours 
1, 
..a.. 
It was apparent from this cast th~lt II~;U~;I~CI~S and st;lff within an organisation have to be 
acceptable to colleagues; liking or at least respect for orhcr organisation members impacts 
on the trust that has to exist if strategy is to be achic\~ccl co-operari\rcIy. The newcomers, 
and particularly those from the chief esccuti\,c’s former ccmpany, that were able to 
overcome the problems of lack of trust appc~~d to be estremcly sensitive to this issue. In 
order to overcome resentment of them they openly demonstrated their commitment to their 
new colleagues by challenging the chief esccuti\,c , and were careful to airoid abusing their 
apparently privileged position. Those ncwco~~~ers that were accepted also demonstrated an 
ability to listen and learn without assuming they already “knew it all”. An example of 
where this did not occur was the marketing director:- _ 
“He tended to speak down to people which is no use, not in a 
team situation.” 
This problem was variously explained as sl~y~~css, lack of confidence, innate arrogance, or 
poor communication ability, however, the ou~~~m of his beha\,iour was that people 
stopped co-operating with him. A common bclicf MS that the marketing expertise within 
the organisation was not used adequately, and branding, advertising, and pricing strategies 
were poorly implemented. 
Another problematic behaviour in the circumstances of the time concerned the ability of 
managers to face up to others. Again, the marketing director and other new managers were 
seen as lacking in this area. The role which the marketing director had taken on, which not 
only encompassed marketing strategy, but also the management of product development 
and the interface between these and the sales IICIWOI-I<, was belie\4 to be far too much for 
one person to cope with. It was belie\4 that hc had been unable to resist the pressure he 
was put under to take on such a wide range of responsibilities, although inexperience which 
blocked the realisation of the enormity of thcsc tasks also appeared to play a part in this. 
However, this inability to face up 10 pcq~lc \\‘;I.*; ;I pr&lciii ill other ways too. The 
marketing director was said to ha\~e ftiilcd to &al with two problcn~ people, both employed 
in important roles. This was 3 criticism \vhich w;ts LIISO le~~cllcd against other less 
successful new managers, including rhc chief csccuri\!c who was seen to be resistant to 
personally dealing with his less compctcnt former collcagucs, particularly the marketing 
director. The general unpredictability of recruitment had led to comparatively high 
numbers of less than competent individuals being in post. This was exacerbated by the 
economic environment which required LI consiclcrclblc reduction in staff numbers. Under 
these circumstances, undcrstsnding IIN IKXLI LO pul the oryanis~riun before the needs of the 
individual meant that a certain ru~hlcss disrc~ard for the person was the result, which 
appeared beneficial in performance rcrms. The rc~no~~l of ineffective staff who not only 
failed to carry out their own work but Au hinclcrcd others from c:lrrying out theirs, was an 
important part of team mrtnagcmcnt, ~iid ~3s p:lrticul2rly crucial in senior roles. 
There were a number of underlying factors which conrributcd to rhis behaviour or its 
absence, for example, sensitiI*ity to others feelings appeared not to be a helpful 
characteristic. One of the new mulagers who W;LS well-rquded deliberately kept personal 
feelings out of 1hc process of staffing decisions:- 
“You set, I’m not son~onc whv gets close to my people, to be 
honest. Fairly close, but 1 alwcl!% like IU keep 3 distance.” 
This was aided by the separation of work and personal relationships, allowing the 
emotional detachment necessary to take difficult and stressful personal decisions. 
The number of prior relationships, particularly in\,ol\*ing the chief executive and his 
former colleagues, appeclrcd to inhibit rltc abiliry to t2kc such difficult personal 
decisions. 
- 
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Discussion and development of theoretic4 propositions, and areas where 
previous research is confirmed, rejected, or extended 
The contextual environment of this company \v;ts ;LII organisation which had experienced 
considerable change over recent years LIIXI \vhicll W;~S bcsct by strategic uncertainty. A new 
chief executive had been appointed IO “noml~lis~” the cumpclny. His perceptions were that 
the quality of many of the staff that he inhcritcd w;ls intideyucltc for the future success of the 
company. This provided him with ;L number oi problcnls:- 3) wh;lt to do with staff who 
were unwilling or unable to accept the new nl:tna~cmcnt and strategic direction and thus 
were disruptive, but at the same tinlc ~xI ncccss;~ry product or industry expertise; and b), 
how to increase the levels of competence of rhosc responsible for developing product or 
marketing opportunities within the company. 1~ cold be argued that this situation was a 
no-win one. Keeping existing staff woulcl pcrpctuarc the low st;undards and would allow 
those individuals who were not supporti\,c of the cl~ngcs to perpetuate the strategic and 
cultural mistakes of recent times. On rhc orhcr hand, dismissing these individuals and 
replacing them with higher quality mfi rccruitcd cstcrnally would remove the core 
expertise and cxpcricncc which any org;lnisvrion needs and which would not be 
immediately available from other sources. 
This dilemma find support in preiious rhcory, mci is a paradox which has also been 
identified by Pfeffer:- “ironically, the politics CJ~ succession rhar nitike change more likely 
with an outsider . . . . also make the choice of ;111 OursicIer nlurc problematic and resistance to 
the new outsider executive more inrcnse” P’feffcr (1981 p 200). There are said to be 
considerable benefits of bringing new “blood” inro an organisation. Past experience 
influences present decisions and beha\*iour (Pc ttigrew 1991), thus people with different 
experiences can introduce change because they bring with them different expectations and 
experiences and are not bound by the existing cultural and group beliefs and values. 
Guthrie and Olian (1991) Sathe 1989, Allcorn lW1, and Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) 
suggest that individuals with extrLI-org~nis~ltional cspcrience, who can bring new ideas, can 
be particularly effecti\,e in conditions of unccrrainry such as changing economic or 
industrial circumstances. Similarly, whcrc inno\*;lrion is needed; Chaganti and Sambharya 
(1987) found that “prospector” conlprlnies h:td rhc highest 1~~~~1 of outsiders in managerial 
roles. 
On the other hand, Szilagyi and Schwcigcr (lY~4) suggest that a market growth strategy 
requires executives to have extensi\re external cvntacts and considerable knowledge of their 
industry. This was supported by Gupt:l (IWO), who suggested that there are well- 
established associations between grealer inJus+ t’;lnliliariry, and build or harvest strategies 
and Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) who found that lack of core csperrise was linked with 
the subsequent failure of the firm. Kortcr (lOS2) U~CI Timmons (lc)Sc)) similarly found that 
successful managers or ~ntr~pren~~rs wcrc highl!~ cspcricnccd and knowledgeable about 
their company or industry and their spcciJist l;n~~wlcd~c LWS rransfer;Ue to new situations 
only with difficulty. 
Although most people felt that the chief‘ c.sccuti\e IUJ achic\ a great deal which had not 
been tackled prior to his arri\,;ll, Kr~rter’s \,ic\v rhclt Inanagerial skills are not easily 
transferable into new contexts found considcr~~blc ~uppor\ ill this c~)mp;~ny. In an attempt to 
bring in people that hc knew had suxcssful track rcc~ords, the chief csccuti\,e had recruited 
a large number of managers from his prc\,ious I‘irm. AI ON point, this group had comprised 
some 15 individuals, or XC;%, of the senior 111:t11;1gcrs of the rime. However, a large 
proportion of these were believed by their new c~IIc;~gucs to be less than competent, and 
they were eventually remo\~cd - Icct\~ing only four remaining. 
Inexperience was a key clement in their lack d competcncc. Their knowledge of the 
industry and product characteristics of the nc~ ~onlpany was inadequate, compounded by 
lack of knowledge of their collcagucs or both formal and informal organisational systems, 
both of which slowed down appropriate action bcin~ ~akcn. In addition, it was believed that 
lack of specific experience on the part of the chief csccuri\rc and other directors had led to 
inappropriate decisions being taken reklting to rhc organisation’s strategic objectives and 
structure, as well as staffing. Espcct:ltions tllaL the c~mpany’s industry and market 
characteristics were the same as his former company csacerbated these problems, a 
phenomenon which appeared to bc cncourr~g~d b!, the “strength in numbers” (Tjosvold 
1991) support hc recci\4 from so~nc of his t\)rlucr collta~ucs who shared similarly 
mistaken beliefs. 
The history, circumstances, and effects of the policy of importing new staff in order to bring 
about change as described abo\re, is shown in figure 4. This conditional path graphically 
represents the sequence of events, and indicates linkages and consequences of this policy, 
as they could be traced within the sul).jcct compalt~. 
insert figure 1 :ibout here 
Given the perceived riced to incrcasc the yuality of existing staff and change the company’s 
direction, this model illustrates the dilcmm:l facing those attempting to introduce change. 
Retaining existing staff would ha\~c pcrpctuatcd rhc low standards and allowed 
inappropriate policies and beliefs to persist. 111 :tddition it would hai*e allowed those 
individuals who were Jisrupti\,c or incompc~cllt to af‘fcct performance by blocking 
communication between organisation scclions, ;lnd prc\,cnliny Co-OpCrLItiOIl within the 
depots. On the other 1~~1, dismissing thcsc incli\,idu:lls and replacing them with higher 
quality staff recruited externally wouIJ rcmo\‘c tllcsc colnmullication and relationship 
networks, and would risk importing pcoplc wile MJOLI~CI IIU~ be acccptablc to existing staff by 
dint of their very different ways of \,icwing rllc world tind their challenging of the status 
quo. However, in this case, it appcarb LIXLI ~llc \‘cry different nature of the industry 
characteristics incrcascd rhc probicms. Al~i1ou~i1 this ~ouid not have overcome the 
difficulty a new manager is likcl!, to cspcricncc in 11ot Imwing the organisation’s existing 
systems or power rcl;ttionships (Minrzbcr_r 1%3), if the ncwcomcrs had come from a 
company with grcatcr product or rnxkc~ simiiaritics. ch:m~!c my ha\pe been introduced 
which was based 011 ;I truer undcrstandin~ of tilt ~n:~ri<ct LIIKI producr characteristics and 
would therefore hai-e h:id a grccltcr chan~c of XC’C~I;~I~~C. 
Another aspect of this dilemma concernccl the rcsis[ancc of‘ existing staff to newcomers 
with different ways of Licwing the won-Id. This problem is reflected to some extent in the 
literature on the performance of lm~~~og~~~ccx~s or hcrcrogcncous groups. Although there has 
been some inconsistency of rcsulrs (Pclti~rcw lW2), in general culturally or 
demographically heterogcncous groups ;lrc solid to bc more cffecti\fe in unstable or dynamic 
environments; homogeneous ones in s~abic cn\~ironments (Pricm IWO). Homogeneity of 
values has been less researched, no doubt in part bcc~.~sc of the contentious and difficult 
nature of their definition or mcasuremcnt (McDon:~ld and Gandz 1992). Hambrick and 
Brandon (1988) claim that it has 1101 yet Ixcn cst;lbiished whether organisational 
performance is hclpcd or hurt II!, homc~~cnous \~ducs within ;I management team. They 
suggest that “there is some c\,iciclm th;it ~.s~rr)mc homogenciry of values helps 
organisational performance by crc:lting a unity l~f’ \,ision ~4 smoothing communication. 
However, evidence also exists that honlogcncity hurts performance by severely restricting 
information processing capabilities.” 
In the case company this commonaliry was fr~gmcntcd, and homogeneity, both of values 
and demographic background, appc;trcci to be both ;L hinclrclncc and ;I help. Homogeneous 
beliefs appeared to be a necessary condition for the dc~~lop~nent of trusting relationships, 
given the extreme turbulence of the compan~‘s internal and external environment at the 
time. The decision to recruit a number of pcopic from the same background is an indicator 
of the perceived need to impose a comnm~ way of l,icwing the world and work within a 
framework of trust. However, the homogcneiry of Llckground of this group gave problems, 
as it appeared to blinker its mcmbcrs from hearing dissenting outside opinions, and 
encouraged the continuation of mist:lkcn beliefs concerning strategy and structure because 
of their failure to undcrst:md the \‘c’r! ciiffcrcnt proclucr chai-acrcristics of the two firms. 
This group sub-culture dso pro\~ici<ci ;t C~)lllllli)ll “iilClll\“’ or scdpcgoat that polarised the 
larger management team and biockcci cc~mln~~ni~~;~~il,n ancl co-opcr:ition (Bcttenhausen 
1991). Those individutils who h:\d pi ior rcia~iollsilips C;ILISL’~ problems by the very fact that 
they were seen to bc ;I scparalc qoup, will1 scp:~rc \~~ducs clnci bciiefs and separate 
privileged chamicls of conllnuniclti~Jl1. 
Hambrick and Brandon (19%) su!zscst :I wa! of o~~crcoming the problems of 
accommodating different WLI~S of \,ic\ving th L world ma!, bc the sclcction of individuals 
with common values, but diffcrcnt cosniti\.c cspcricnccs. III the sul?jcct company, despite 
the potentially beneficial cffccts of the dcn;o~r~~phic hctcrogcneity of the top team, major 
disagreements over policies and str;~~cgy clller+A, :~ncl rather 111~1 this leading to a 
sufficiency of ideas and solutiolls, it lcci to ct,tlflict, ilick of clarity throughout the 
organisation, and evcntualiy to the clisin~cgration of the top team. Johnson provides one 
answer to this dilemm:~ and suggcsls that ~~i~llou~!h ~IICIX ;II’C likeI!* to bc differing views 
within an organisation, at some Ic\,ci thcrc 1~s 10 IX ;I dcsrcc of commonality:- “Whilst 
individual managers may hold quiic \,aryin_r SCLS 1~1‘ hclicfs dmur I~~~~II~ different aspects of 
that organisational world, there is l&cl!, IO csisl :II SOIIIC lc\,cl ;I core set of beliefs and 
assumptions held rclati\pcly commonly by the manag!crs”, in other words the paradigm, or 
culture (Johnson 1992). This UYIS conspicuoA!, l:lckin~ in this case, perhaps not 
surprisingly given the 0rg;Lnis:ition’s IiisIory ;Iilcf d c%rL’c 1Jf ci~~~ngc thtir it had gone through. 
However, the prior idcntifieation of commonality on kc)i f:lctors, particularly those relating 
to the organisation’s strategy, may ha\‘c been ;L ~s~f’ul tool in surfacing areas of potential 
conflict within the top team. Howc\‘cr, 3s ycr. this concept rlppcars to be at a very early 
stage of development (McDonr~id and G~unclz 1991, and Priem 1990). Current models take 
no account of differences in LYIIUCS th;~t :lrc likciy to csist bcrwccn different functional areas 
such as marketing and finance, alrllc~u~h Szil:lgyi and Schwcigcr (1984) ha\.e noted the 
difficulties in managing the boundaries bctwccn such diffcrcnt areas. 
In this company, the sheer newness of the top tc;~111 :~nd rhc large numbers of changes to 
other managers may have conrriburcd to thcsc problems and hindered the processes of team 
development. This problem is one which 1~1s ;II~L-;IcI\’ been identified in the case of high 
growth companies (for csamplc HLunbrick and Crazier 1OS5) in the problem of integration 
and acculturisation of large numbers of staff at the same time. Gi\,en this fast-changing 
and turbulent environment certain bcha\*iours wcrc particularly important, exacerbated by 
the perception that a high proportion of IICM’ I~~~II~~~~c~s wcrc “in the pocket” of the chief 
executive. The managers from this group thtl~ found acceptance appeared to be extremely 
sensitive to this issue, a bcha\riour known to incrcclsc the likely acceptance of innovations 
(Howell and Higgins 1990), or chun~c (Kirton IO&i). Successfully assimilated managers in 
the case company WCI-c careful to dcmonstrarc their commitment to the new organisation, 
and show their indepclldcnce 1~1, st:~llJin~ up 10 tllcir forlncr collcaguc. In addition, they 
showed sensiti\fity about llleir O\VII I:lcl, 01‘ ~sp<riclli~ OI- I;~l~)\vlcdgc. As ;I result they were 
trusted, and accepted. M’I1Cl.C SUCll Il‘USl \\‘;I?; 1~11’1\111~. :LIIJ \vhcrc the indi\~idual concerned 
was in a central role, 111~ cficct W;LS bclic\,ccl 10 hc criiical to the performance of the 
company (figure 5). 
Insert l’igure 5 abuul here 
One important contingent bch:t\,iour ws the abili\y to confront others. Its impact related 
principally to the dismissal of poorly pcrl‘ormin~ s~fl’, but 4so to the taking and 
implementing of decisions, ” fightin_r” for what WIS lxlic\~ccl to be right, and the gaining of 
-- respect and co-opcr3tion from staff. Sell‘-collfidcncc. which appcarcd to be a key 
underlying personality chxxtcristic contributin_r to this bcha\~iour, is identified within 
many of the managerial cffccti\,cncss or comp~~c’ncc moclcls (for example Campbell, 
Dunnelte, Lawler, and Wcick 1970: Elkin IW)). i1 ow\‘cr, &spite considerable anecdotal 
evidence about the ruMcssncss of rn:~n!~ succe~sl‘ul c.sccuri\,cs, i\ seems to have been .- 
subject to remarkably littlc empirical cs;~rnin:~~~~xl. \vi~h 111~ csccption of those writers who 
identify the beha\%urs required to m:lin\xin paver (1’or c,~~nplc Pcttigrcw 1973; Kotter 
- - 1982; Pfeffer 1982; ~tnd Mintzbcrr 19H3). As dismissals are potcntisll!, extremely 
stressful and difficult processes, p:lrticularl)’ whcrc’ close collcagucs are concerned, factors 
such as friendships or prior relationships :ulcl thus loyalties or the lack of ruthless 
detachment would make such decisions more difficult and act as ;I block to appropriate 
action being taken. 
.- 
In the case of the sut,jcct company the ~bscncc of this type of behaviour, particularly in key 
individuals such as the chief esccuti\,c, the nnrkctillg clircctor, and ;L number of other 
managers, all of whom wcrc pcrcci\,cd ro h:~\~e fxilcd IV tackle problematic staff quickly, 
was believed to ha\.c considcrablc impact on the perform~~cc of the organisation, 
particularly given that the compctcncc of many of Ilic Ix-~c numbers of new recruits was 
seen to be low. As a result their collcagucs stxtccl “working round” problem individuals, 
thus blocking the efficient esch:ulgc of infr)rnlati~,n ;1a1 idas. Problems in the supply and 
development of products escalated, lc:tdin_r to poor scri,icc qutility, and the loss of 
commercial opportunities. The crcdibili[~ of 11x mrula~cr W;IS 4so reduced, leading in most 
cases to the eventual dcparturc of tlx illdi\~iJual conccrn~cl ;~I~cI yet more disruption due to 
personnel changes. 
However, the abilit), to m~ik~ xcur;~tc ;~SXSSI~~CI~~S chum pcrform3ncc was blocked by a 
number of factors to do \vith the influ.\ of IX\\’ IIKII~:I~C’I’S. 111 the first place it took time for 
those new rnanagcrs who c;mlc fro111 dil‘ferc’llt industries to become ;lwxe of a colleague’s 
lack of competcncc; 3SSCSSlllcllls ;Ll)out tlic rccluirc’lllc’llls of the role were based on 
mistaken assumptions. Similar-lb,, rllc IC~IKICII;! to sit, c :I pr&l~nl incli\,idual the benefit of 
the doubt, in the short term at Ic:tst, also cIcI;L!~ccI LIK tal;illg of ctismiss;;Il decisions. This 
process is shown in Figure 6. 
insert figure 6 abull here 
Conclusion 
This paper has outlined some of the factors which influenced the assimilation arid thus 
effectiveness of new managers within ;~n or@sation tlx~t ws attempting to change its 
strategic position. It h:is highli$tccl the complesit~ of 111~ effects which large numbers of 
inexperienced staff, and rcsultin~ I:lcl i of illdustr!, knowlcdgc or competence have on 
strategic decisions and thus tllc ~CI.~‘O~III;U~ LC of LIIC I‘irlll. It Il;ls ;Jso highlighted the need 
for commonality of \xlucq if new stdi ;LI’C L~J lx x;c’ptcJ illto the firm, and thcrcby form 
co-operative relationships, and the iiced for spccil‘ic bclla\~i~,urs in tlicsc circumstances if 
managers who are inadcquatc are not to rcnxlin ~111~1 ;larn;~~~ rhc organisation’s perfomlance. 
Although generalisations ha\,c to bc mxlc with some cxc from this study, the nature of the 
grounded methodolog!,. in which thcorctic4 propositions UC tested within the data itself, 
suggests that sonic aspects of tl~csc findings ma! be ;tpplicablc to other managerial 
situations. For example. CL’CII though the specific urganisational circumstances may be 
unique, managerial tasks are similar across m;tny or~~unis~ltional types. The management of 
change is frequently ;tttcmptcd, ~1~1 the ;Ippointmcnt of now staff with the intention of 
introducing change is also known to occur. Gi\~cn the 3pp:lrent uncertainty surrounding 
recruitment, the remo\~al of poor staff ma!, also bc ~111 important and regular managerial 
task, although the very cxtrcmc dcyrcc of trxisition and turmoil experienced in this firm 
may not be common. ‘l’hus ;~lthc~u~h it is ~knowlcd~cd th;lt generalisability camlot be the 
same as that generated by other, more yuxltitsti\‘c mcthod~~logics, it is hoped that the 
findings from this stud!, will xld IL) our un&rst:ulJill~ of the comple?;it~ that is involved in 
managing change in organisations. 
,- 
..- 
- 
- 
References 
Agor, Weston 
“Intuitive Managcmcnl 
Prentice Hall 
1984 
Agor, Weston 
“The logic of intuition: how top csc<uli\.ch III;L~C: ill~p~Jr~~lI1~ clcc:i:,ions” 
Organisational Dynamics 
Winter 1986 
Allcorn, Seth 
“Keep Individuality in Top Man;~~c~ncn~” 
Personnel Journal 
Vol.: 69 No: 4 April 19%) 
Bergwerk, Jonathan 
“Recruitment and sclccrion for company cul\urc” 
Journal of Managerial t)s~cholog~ 
Vol. 3 No. 1 198X 
Bettenhausen, Kenneth L 
“Five years of group rescarch; what WC ha\,c Icarn~d ;lnd wh:lr needs 10 be addressed” 
Journal of managemcni 
Vol. 17 no 2 1991 
Bird, Barbara 
Implementing Entreprcncurial ldccls; the Cast For Intention 
Academy of Managcnxnt Rcvicw 
Vol. 13 No 3 July 1988 
Birley, Sue, And Norburn, David 
“Owners And Managers; The Venture 100 L’s The Forrunc 500” 
Journal Of Business Vcnturiny 
Vol. 2, 1987 
Boyatzis, R E 
“The competent Manager. a moclcl ior cffcc[i\,c pc’rl’~~rm~uxx” 
Wiley 
New York 1982 
Briggs Myers, Isabel; x11d Myers, l’ctc~ 
“Gifts Differing” 
Consulting Pq~cliologisIs Press 
1980 
Campbell, Dunnctte, Lawlcr, and \Vcick 
“Managerial behaviour, pcrfornxulcc ;~nd cl‘l‘cc’ti\~c~l<?;s” 
McGraw Hill 
New York 1970 
Chaganti, Rajeswarsrao; and S;~~nI)h;~rya, K;~kcsh 
“Strategic orientation atid ch;lrac’lcris[ics 01. LIP~~I’ III:uu_~~I~~I~~” 
Strategic Managcmcnt Journ; 
Vol. 8 1987 
Chell, Elizabeth 
“The Characteristics of Entrcprcmm and Entrcpr~lxuri:d Firms: ;I Fresh Approach” 
Paper Given At 13th Small Firms Policy md l’\sswr~h Confcrcncc 
Harrogate 1990 
Child, John 
“Managerial and organis;ltion:ll I’x~ors ~lssociarccl \\‘i\h c~npany pcrforlimxe” 
Journal of Managcmcnt Studies 
October 1974 
Cockerill, Ton) 
“The kind of competcncc for rqicl change” 
Personnel Management 
Vol. 21 no 9 Sept. 1089 
Cornwall, Jeffrey R and Pcrlman, fixon 
“Organisational entreprclleurship” 
Irwin, Boston 
1990 
Daniel, Christopher 
“Science System Or Hunch: Altcmtti\~c Approxhcs to Improving Employee Selection” 
Public Persomiel Management 
Vol. 15 No 1 1986 
D’Avcni, Richard A; MacMilh. Ia11 C 
“Crisis and the Content of Mmagcri~~l Cl~I~1I1~ltl~i~‘:;~i~~~~~: A Stucl~ of tllc Focus of Attention 
of Top Managers in Sunri\*ing ~IILI Failing 1%11s” 
Administrative Science Quar~crl.~ 
Vol. 35 No 4 Dec. 1990 
Dixon M 
“The Very Model Of A Mythical M~nagcr” 
Financial Times 
10/.5/89 
Duncan. Ginter, Rucks, and Jacobs 
“Intraprcneurship and rhc Rcin\,cntins of 111~: Curpomrim” 
Business Horizons 
May 1988 
Elkin, Graham 
“Competency-Based Human Resource Dc~~~lupnlc~~~” 
Industrial and Commercial Trsilling 
Vol. 22 No 4 1990 
Foxall, Gordon R. - 
“Managers in transition: an empirical test of Kirtoll’s acl~ptioll-inn~~~~ti~)ll theory and its 
implications for the mid-career MBA” 
Technovation (Ncthcrlands) 
Vol. 4 No 3 June 1986 
Geneen, Harold 
“Why Intrapreneuring Doesn’t Work” 
Venture 
January 1985 
Gibb, Allan A 
“Designing effective programmes for cncoulagillg tlx business start-up process: lessons 
from UK experience” 
Journal of European hclustrid tr:dnill~ 
Vol. 11 No 4 1987 
Gibb, Allan, and Dai,ics, Les 
“In Pursuit of Frameworks For the Dc~~clon~~~cnt o ‘ C;rowth Models of the Small Business” 
International Small Busi~lcss Journd 
October 1990 
Ginn, Charles; and Scs~on, Dun~~ld L 
“A comparison of the pcrson:~lir!, rypc dim<llsions 01’ ~11~ IVS7 111~. 5W Cornpan! 
foundcr/CEO’S with those of slowc~~ qw~~11 iirnls’ 
Journal Of Business Vcnruring 
Vol. 5 No 5 September 1WO 
Ginsberg, Ari; and Buclloltz. AIHI 
“Are entrepreneurs ;I breed ;~p:~rt’! a look ;I[ rlic c\.i~lc~lcc‘” 
Journal Of General Mm~~gemcnr 
Winter 1989 
Glaser, Barney G And Srrauss, AIISC~III L 
“The Discovery Of Grm~~hxl ‘I’hcor!~: Slrarcgics For Qu;LIihIi\‘e Rmxu-ch” 
Aldine New York 
1967 
Grossi, Giovanni 
“Promoting imio\:ation in ;I big business” 
Long Range Planning 
Vol. 23 No 1 Feb. 1990 
Gupta, Anil K 
“Contingency linkages l~~wccn stralegy and gencr:tl ~nrtnagcr characteristics: a conceptual 
examination” 
Academy of Managcmcnt Rc\*icw 
Vol. 9 No 3 84 
Guthrie, James P; Olian, judy D 
“Does context affect staffing decisions’? The: USC of ~cncr~~l managers” 
Personnel psycholog! 
p263 - 292 1991 
Guthrie, James P; Grimnl, Curtis M; and Smilh, lk11 G 
“Environmental change and nlanclgcmcnt sr;iffing: :!:I cnlpiric;tl stud, 
Journal of Management 
Vol. 17 No 3 1991 
Hambrick, Donald C; and D’A\,cni. Riclwcl A 
“Top team deterioration ;IS parr of tllc do\vn\v:~rd spir:~l of large corpor;ltc bankruptcies” 
Management Scicncc 
Vol. 38 110 l- Ott 1993 . - 
Hambrick, Donald C; :~ncl M;wll, Phyllis A 
“Upper echelons: the organisation ;~s ;I ~1‘1 * cilioll ~1. ikh lop n!.~iagcrs” 
Academy of Managcmcnt Rc\,iw 
Vol. 9 No 3 1983 
Hambrick, Donald C; and Br;wlon, Gcr4cl L 
“Executive values” 
in 
Hambrick, Donald C (Ed) 
“The executive cffcct. C’o~cpts and n~cthods for s[udying top managers” 
JAI Press Connecticut 
1988 
Hambrick, Donald; and c‘rozic‘r. Ly11n 
“Stumblers and stars in the m~~n;tycmcnt of rapid gro\vth” 
Journal of Business Venturing 
Vol. 1 1985 
Handy, Charles 
“The age of unreason” 
Penguin London 
1989 
Hassard, John; and Sharifi, Sucli 
“Corporate Culture and Strategic Change” 
Journal of General Management 
Winter 1989 
Herriot, Peter (Ed.) 
“Assessment and selection in or_ranisations” 
Wiley 
Chichester 1989 
Hornaday, John A 
“Research About Living Entrcprencurs” 
in 
Kent, Scston and Vcspcr (4s.) 
Encyclopaedia of Entrcprcncurship 
Prentice Hall 1983 
Howell, Jane M; Higgins, Chris~ophcr A. 
“Champions of Change: lden~il‘!~illg, Undcrs[:,nclin+ 211~1 Supporring Chmpions of 
Technological Inno\*ations” 
Organizational Dynamics 
Vol. 19 No 1 Summer 1990 
Johnson, Gerq 
“The application of groundccl tllwr!’ to ;I SILICA\’ OI ~‘~~por;lk guwth” 
Aston University Managcmcnr C‘cnrrc 
Working Paper no 2 12 
July 1981 
Johnson, Gerry 
“Managing strategic cl;:~nge - s~~-ati:gy, cul~urc: :incl ;,c~~oI~” 
Long Range Planning 
Vol. 25 No. 1 1992 
Johnson, Gerr) 
“The process of stratcsic cha11~~: ;I I~~;II~;~~~,c’I,~L’III p:r,p<<[i\,z” 
PhD Thesis 
Aston Uni\*ersity 198-l 
Kaish, Stanley; and Gilad, B<~~.j;ullill 
“Characteristics of opportunities sc~wh of cl~trcprw~urs \‘ersus executiim: sources, 
interests, general alertness” 
Journal Of Business Vcnruring 
Vol. 6 No 1 Jan. 1991 
Kanter, Rosabcth M 
“When Giants Learn to Dance” 
Simon and Schuster 
London 1989 
Kirton, M J 
“Adaptors and Inno\‘ators: Why New Initiatives Get Blocked” 
Long Range Planning 
Vol. 17 1984 
Kirzner, Israel 
“Competition and Eii~r~prcneur~i~i~” 
University of Chicago Press 
1973 
Kotter, John 
“The general managers” 
Free Press New York 
1982 
Kraut, Allen J; Pcdig, Parrici:, I<; hlcI<cml:~; D Uk)i~gIas. ;~nJ Dunncttc, Marvin D 
“The role of the manaqrs; \vh;~~‘s redly inlpurtan\ ill .litl’cr~ll~ n~~~~agen~cn~ jobs" 
Academy of Managemcn~ Excc‘uti\,c’ 
Vol. III No 4 1989 
Lewis, Christopher 
“Employee Selection” 
Hutchinson 1985 
Mamiix, Elizabeth A; \Vhitc, Sally Ulw~m 
“The impact of distributi\,c unccrt;\inty on c:o:lliriull fvrm:\tioo in organizations” 
Organizational Beha\,iour & I-Iu~uI~ Decision PIUL~~~~,CS 
Vol. 2 March 1992 
McCrac, Norman 
“The coming entrcprcncurial rc~ olurion” 
Economist X/12/76 
McDonald, Malcolm tl I3 
“The theory and practice of marketing planning for iuLluslritil good!, in international 
markets” 
PhD Thesis 
Cranfield 1982 
McDonald, Paul; and Gandz, Jcffre! 
“Identification of values relc\~;u~t IO business rcsc;~~~cI~” 
Human Resources M~~na~~n~c~~r 
Vol. 30 No 2 1991 
Miner, John B 
“Entrepreneurs; high growth cntreprcncurs, ud liuxlgel-s; ctJlitraStillg and overlapping 
motivational patterns.” 
Journal Of Business Vcnruriil~ 
Vol. 5 1090 
Mintzbcrg, Hem-! 
“Power in and around or_r:lnis;lttions” 
Prentice Hall 
Engelwood Cliffs 1083 
Mintzbc rg, Hcnq 
“The Nature Of Man:igcri;ll \Y\)rk” 
Harper and Row, 
New York 1973 
Nystrom and Stat-buck (cds.) 
“A handbook of organizational clcsi~rl” 
Oxford University Press 
Oxford 1981 
Olson, Philip D 
“Entrcprcncurship and ~Man~~~c~~lcut” 
Journal of small business mana~cmcut 
Vol. 2.5 No 3 July 1987 
Parker, David 
“Measuring changes in o1.g:313is;ltioll;~I pcrformancc” 
Internal Paper 
Cranficld 1991 
Peters, Tom 
“Success rewards the accidciit prone” 
Independent on Sunday 
27/6/03 
Pettigrew, Andrew 
“On studying managerial clitcs” 
Strategic Managcmcnt Journal 
Vol. 13 1992 
Pettigrcw, Andrew 
“The politics of organisational decision making” 
Tavistock, London 
1973 
Pfeffcr, Jcffrcy 
“Power in organizations” 
Pitrnan 
Marshficld 1981 
Priem, Richard L 
“Top rnmagcnlcnt team group f;~ctors, CO~~IISUS, ~lliil firm piJ:rfl~lIll~lll~L’” 
Strategic Managcmcnt Joumd 
Vol. 11 pp 409 -47s l?)c)O 
Rosen, Michael 
“Organisational Ethnograph! ” 
Journal of Managcmcnt Studies 
January 1991 
Sathe, Vijap 
“Fostering Entrcprcncurship iI1 [IX L;II-SC, I>i~+~~~?;il‘~L~J I+IIH” 
Organizational Dynalnics 
Vol.: 18 No: 1 Summer 198~~ 
Schollhanmer, Hans 
Internal Corporate Entrcprcncurship 
In 
Kent, Sexton and Vcspcr (EA.) 
Encyclopaedia of Entrc;prcnci1~ship 
Prentice Hall 1982 
Sexton, Donald and Bown~n, Nancy 
“The Entrepreneur. * ;I CapatAc Escculi\,c clnd Marc” 
Journal of Business Vcnturin~ 
Winter 1955 
Shanklin, William L 
“Fortune 500 Dropouts” 
Planning Review 
May 1980 
Starbuck, William 1-I; ancl Millilicll, F’IXICCS J 
“Executi\.cs pcrccplLl;I~ filicrs: \\,ll;iI 111.‘)’ l!kJ\l':i c 11:,I ll,,:i~ 1IIL. \ 1nakc SCll.>i" 
in 
Hambrick, Donald C (IId) 
“The csccutii*e cffccl. Clo~lclcp~s ~111~1 11l~tll4~ 1.01 .SL b.iJ ing ikJp iiuii;~gci3” 
JAI Press Connecticut 
1988 
Szilagyi, Andrew D: and Sch\vciqr, D:t\,icl hd 
“Matching managers to sir;ltcsics: :I rc\*ic\\, :~IKI su~r:~r~d 1~1mcwork” 
Academy of Managcn~c~~~ Rci,icw 
Vol. 9 No 4 198-I 
Timmons, Jcffry a 
“The Entrcprcncurial Mind” 
Brick House Publishers 
1989 
Tjosvold, Dean 
“Team org:lnization” 
Wile) 
New York 1991 
Turner, Barry A 
“Some practical aspects of qurilitati\,c: data an2lysi~;; 0ne wcl!’ of organising the cognitive 
processes associated \vith the scncr:llic,ii 01’ s?round~~i lhcor!,” 
Quality and Quantit! 
Vol. 15 1981 
Van DC Ven, Andrew 
“Central problems in the in;u~;i~cin~‘nl of illlloi~atiull” 
Management Science 
Vol 33 19S6 . - 
Varadara.jan, P Rajan, and R;~lnanuj~uu, \/~~sudc~~a~~ 
“The Corporate Pcrf‘ormancc C~,~~ui~clrum: ;I S\ 11t1l;his VI‘ C~JI~~CIII~~J~X~~ Views and an 
Extension” 
Journal of Managcmcnr Sludics 
September 1990 
Watson, Wxrcn E; l<un1;1r. I‘;;~I~LL~;~I: ;u..I :\lic~l~;~l~,~~~, Luq K 
“Cultur;Ll di\,crsity’s impact on inlcr:lilioil prNcs> :11k1 pd0~~~~2lu; winparing 
homogcnous and di\*crsc ILlsI< groups” 
Academy of Managcnlcn~ Jwr11A 
Vol. 36 no 3 June 1993 
Wiersclm, Margxcthc F 
“Strategic coiisequcnccs of csccuLi\,c siiccisiioll \viiliin cli\,crsificd firills” 
Journal of Managcmvnt StuciL 
Vol. 20 No 1 Jan. 1992 
Wiersema, Margarethc F; ~tml Uan~cl, l<a1.c11 .-I
“Top managcmcnt tcalll clen~~~~~-apl~~~ mid co~~p~jral~ >Lrs\cgic change:” 
Academy of Managcmcnt JOLIIXI~ 
Vol. 35 No 1 pp 01 - 12 1 1992 
1. Undcrstandin~ what 1lCCClb IO Ix ClOlli 
reasollili$; \~isioilill L$-: l~ll~)\\‘-ll~J~\ c’.~~p”l“ls” 
7 Y. Influencing and gainins support 
comniunic~ltioils; iiilcr-pcrwwl .sl;ilis; pcrso~lal impact; direct 
influencing; or~:aliis:~rii)n~11 iill‘lui‘nc1il~ 
3. Producing the results 
directing: moti\‘;~tin~: pralti~.\i;‘i~~~ 
4. Achieving agxinsl tltc odcl:, 
a) ciitcrpl-i5,;: 
sell’-Iiioli\‘;lli~)li: iii,ili;iLi\,c. t:;i:tiilj’; ili~ormatiuii-secl<iii~ 
b) CcmfiJciicc 
sic’If-c~,lll’iilc’Ili.i; ii<il.bi\ i:lcsb 
c) richic\~clnclil 
;Icl~ic\~c’liic111 ilri\ C; C;~l~iil:liC.i I.iali--L;ll\illg 
d) rcsiliC1i;C 
SCli’-Collar01; i/c.\ibiliL\‘: hIlc’,h itJiCl-;llliL’ 
i~$li‘C 1 
Generic nl;ill:igcA;tl cu~;tp~~~~~cc~ (Suurcc lU;in IYYO) 
- 
. 
c uI:I~,:,;.l ‘. a i., L”.,ipAi’:~tibC ~JI‘did~ glWllpS 
Subject CIUL,j, .I ~i~~~iip :: GlxJL.p c 
Turnover (Figures we in fWi)s.) 
1989 02 I SOS .25400 12 6%) 
1990 6s I ,is-c 2kYhX 13sot, 
1991 OS IV51 2bl29 167X? 
1992 s’) 1747 29 N, 16575 
1993 s9 I507 j j j 5 ij 1372s 
Growth in period - 5 !h t 3’% .!, 1 ‘,A t 24% 
(1989 - 1993) 
After tax profits (Figures are in .$Mus.) 
1989 S.0 I I:! 
1990 4.7 7s 
1991 3.6 iJ\I 
1992 I .-I 0.i 
1993 I .s 71 
Growth in period 
1989 - 1 W3 40% - i.C”? 
I %-I 76137-I 
2024 sso2 10 
3 ‘,3-/ -- - 1 tt,(j(Jl 
,u2-+ -6633 1 --
I vs-1 120303 
-I .;, t t . -8.i c 
ROCE (?b) 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Growth in period 
1989 - l!W 
29.7 3i5 -. ._ 1 il.s7 19.59 
21.5 12.9 1 ‘Jl.3-c l-I.13 
15.0 12.13 1 s.7s 7.1 
1 1 .o- ‘) j:! 1.i 3.83 
13.3 I il.4 17.7-c 6.83 
-63% -.Sb’ii --+j’/;, -GS(ic. - / 
UK coniptiny groups Group A = Il!Jus!ri.. L,! Il:.:~lch, ail. i.oilditiollilig, md vcnring 
CwulJ U = Di\~crsil‘iccl :iihsLri;A 
Gmtip C = 13:lilchg alld wllstruc~ion 
COlll~~~l1’~~ti b’i ~~~I’I’J1.i~I:~ri;i liU,iil’CS 
(Source: Darastrcxn: :m.l I-,\\I!-; il;;~;ilw,;s Ma! I W-l ) 
Category, groups, ca!csol.ics (:ukl .siil~.siciicl/;~~-c~lli’~o/.ies) 
Strategy 
Organisation :- 
contingencies 
Staffing: 
Personal Attributes:-- 
Chan~cs. COIISCIIS~S :I~J unclcrsrmding; Products; Markets. 
Hisiory O~,:/~l,/.ntri//c,~,; pr(~ilu~7 expertise; qdity of’stafn 
Ecoiwlliic cll\,irwrllc~llI. 
liccruilmc~lt; Dislllisi:lls; Role. 
Espcricnci (r/.tr/~sJ;~/~~rl,ilir~~, lenrniilg curves); Prior 
rcl:ltioilsllips; sl1:ll.cil \Tllu~s; rutlllcsslless (emotional 
re.rilic!~~ci:: ol)jectivii~~; colrfi*oth~g; autlwrity; security; self- 
CYJllfidUlW); C<)llccI.ll for others fji/irr~e.ss; motivating); 
Comnluiiicati\~cn~ss (.wci/lg; /tearing; speaking) 
Consequences:- Control: Conlpctcncc; Credibility; Motivation / de- 
niori\~aliw; Allhlccs; Performance 
ream effectiveness:- Tcml clc\~clop1iie1i1: Powr; Coalitions. 
Figure 3 
Categories anil c:tlegdry g:ruups 
‘stralgtl, I” Ilrilllbrls’ 
.~~-~~~~ 
rlllil ledrlllli~ 
) LirCh 01 lole 
--? cowp.,c!nce M  
. srr.lreyy 
/ LdCh “, spac,r,c . Jp~“‘“t”‘e”t= 
I IIIllYSLI~ 2nd 
; cornp*iiy 
P-----J 
. opGmons 
/ nllowlblge 
Conditional path i’ur impxt ol’ recruitment policy 
F igure 4 
j EII ei,,.c I 
/LUI 
I - 1 1;,,:,,: _I..^ I_ 1 -md-rYl --lEEl 
piEiqflZ] I 
q-d T”;:,;;:r:, r 1 ~YxY= j-cfll -1 ,,;izi;“ce 1 
new colleagues - ’ 1m Little effect 
T 
__) 0” company El performance 
1 Ljzh 01 t: US1 
Conditiona! path for :whrilatitili :tnd impact of’new recruit 
Condilion:d prth I’or dismissLrls 
l+urt (; 
“Staffing as a lever of strategic change - the influence of managerial experience, 
behaviour and values” 
Alison Rieple 
Tel +44 (0) 71607 0659 (home) 
: Fax +44 (0) 71609 7846 (home) 
. 
I I I I t I i I 1 I 1 
“Staffing as a lever of strategic change - the influence of managerial experience, 
behaviour, and values” 
Introduction 
This paper is based on an interpretative study of an entire management team within a single 
company. It examines the factors such as the values, experience, and behaviours of new 
managers within the company which influenced their assimilation, and thus affected the 
effectiveness of the organisation at a particular moment in time. In this case the firm had a 
new chief executive who was attempting to re-focus the company’s strategic position, and 
new staff were intended to be a major lever with which to effect change. However, it was 
widely perceived that some of the new managers were less successful in this than they 
might have been. This paper therefore reports on the factors which appeared to contribute 
to their relative failure. 
Th&r&ical background 
. . This study crosses a number of theoretical boundaries and draws upon a number of bodies 
of literature, including those which have examined the personalities and behaviour of 
managers and latterly related these to the strategic contingencies of the organisation. 
. 
Research in the area of management and leadership has a long and wide-ranging history. 
This can broadly be divided into that which identifies the personality characteristics of 
managers, (Kaish and Gilad 1991; Ginn and Sexton 1990; Miner 1990); to what managers 
actually do (Rotter 1982, Mintzberg 1973); or what behaviours lead to managerial success, 
often meaning the subsequent career success of the individual concerned (Cockerill ‘1989; 
Boyatzis. 198% ..Campbell et al 1970). -.However, there has been developing criticism of 
research which has looked at personality characteristics without taking account of the 
context in which particular characteristics may be helpful (Kraut et al 1989). Many of these 
characteristics, for example internal locus of control or need for achievement (Sexton and 
Bowman 1985), or intuition (Agor 1984) can be found across a wide variety of organisation 
settings ‘or roles. Because of this gap- it’ appears to be increasingly recommended that 
.- -.. processes (Cornwall and Perlman 1990; Ranter 1989) or how behaviour influences 
performance (Sexton and -Bowman 1985; Gibb and Davies 1990) should be the focus for :. ’ : .I.- 
re&&rch rather’than managerial characteristics’in isplation. ,I, ;. J.. -. :. ..I . 
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.- A large list of managerial tasks or behaviours has similarly been identified (Mintzberg 
1973; Nystrom and Starbuck 1981; Kotter 1982). Some of this stream of research has also 
attempted to link such behaviours with managerial effectiveness (for example Campbell et 
al 1970). The ability to motivate staff, to build teams, to delegate, to plan and set direction, 
to evaluate, to take decisions, to communicate, to recognise and solve problems, to 
understand finance, to manage costs, and to work hard have all been cited as important 
managerial functions (Gibb 1987, Bird 1988, Olson 1987). This body of work has recently 
been developed into models of generic management competences, which combine both 
behavioural and personality elements. An example is provided by Elkin (1990), where such 
competences are gathered into four main groups (figure 1) 
Insert figure 1 about here 
However, such models pay little attention to the processes or context whereby such 
competences are effective, and as with personality characteristics, the attempt to identify 
generic skills without regard for situation has seen increasing criticism (Gibb and Davies 
1990, Varadarajan And Rarnanujam 1990). There appears to be a growing awareness that 
the context of the organisation’s culture, and economic environment, as well as managerial 
level all have to be taken into account when identifying appropriate managerial 
characteristics or behaviour (Guthrie and Olian 1991; Kraut et al 1989). 
,: 
These criticisms of the failure to take context into account when examining managerial 
effectiveness have been further developed by those who advocate contingent .linkages 
between the strategic orientation of the organisation, and the required leadership or 
managerial characteristics or behaviour needed to successfully implement it. Many of these . 
studies have concentrated on the relationship between demographic characteristics such as 
age or industry experience and strategic preferences, rather than behaviour or personality 
(Guthrie et al 1991; Gupta 1984; Child 1974), and few have attempted to look at the means 
whereby such characteristics influence strategic decision making. Pettigrew (1992) for 
example suggests that the stream of demography research has been weakened by the fact 
that “no-one has ever been near:a top team in an organisational setting either to directly 
observe a team in action, or to interview the members about the links between their 
..’ characteristics and structure, processes of communication and decision-making and their 
. impact X and ‘performance”. ‘However, some. research under the strategic contingency 
5 .‘..’ framework’has looked at industry or company experience. Many have commented on the 
benefits that “new blood” can bring to a company (Hofer 1982; Chaganti and Sambharya 
1987,; Sathe 1989; Allcom 1990). A new chief executive from outside the company 
indicates that a change of strategy, of whatever nature, is likely to follow, often as the result 
of poor organisational performance prior to the change (Hofer 1982; Guthrie and Olian 
1991). However, although the correlation between change of chief executive and strategy is 
comparatively well documented (for example Wiersema and Bantel 1992), fewer studies 
have looked at the mechanisms whereby particular attributes subsequently influence the 
implementation of strategy, particularly where this is new to the organisation. At this time, 
the organisation is likely to be in a state of considerable uncertainty identified in many of 
the company life-cycle models (for example Johnson 1992). Under these circumstances 
the required attributes of managers may be very different from those in companies which 
are in a state of strategic stability. 
Many (for example Hassard and Sharifi 1989) have also commented on the difficulty of 
achieving cultural change. When new senior executives try to make modifications, they 
discover strong bonds within the organisation which reject new initiatives. Thus the use of 
power, by means of contingent behaviours such as the-ruthless removal of un-supportive 
staff, and the substitute of sympathisers may be an important behaviour. Changing staff . . 
may have the effect of reinforcing the organisation’s new ideology through the selection of 
personnel who will support the new direction. In addition the use of individuals who had 
been supporters of the old regimes and have converted become powerful symbols of 
change. Those who do not subscribe to the new ways must be removed or omitted from the 
decision-making processes (Johnson 1984). In this way recruitment, .promotion, and 
dismissals become important symbolic actions of commitment to the strategy. However, 
although this aspect of managerial behaviour has intuitive appeal and has been documented 
previously (by for example Pfeffer 1982 and Mintzberg l’983), it has been subject to 
comparatively little research. For example, it is not known on what basis these individuals 
are selected, what makes such a policy effective, or the processes whereby such actions 
may influence change through the effect that it has on other organisation members. 
: 
.One gap, for example, appears to be in our understanding of the selection of new staff 
according to their ability. to develop relationships with others in order to allow the 
organisation to continue to operate as a team. The processes ,by which attributes, such as 
experjence, behaviours or values,. allow the assimilation of new members into the 
.’ organisation are &tle understood. Studies into team processes, for example, have tended to 
concentrate on smah taskgroups in artificial situations and not on organisations as a whole 
(Tjosvold 1991). Similarly, the large volume of research into recruitment has tended to 
focus on the techniques of recruitment (Her-riot 1989) or the subsequent career success of 
the individual (Bergwerkl988) rather. than on the processes which .facilitate the acceptance 
of the newcomer into the specific organisational context, or the motives behind managerial 
selection decisions (Bergwerk 1988; Guthrie et al 1991; Guthrie and Olian 1991). For 
example, one way in which individuals may be chosen is if they are perceived to share the 
same value systems as their chief executive, thus allowing change to be introduced within a 
framework of trust (Starbuck and Milliken 1988). However, where such value systems are 
out of line with those already existing in the organisation, which is perhaps inevitable where 
change is being contemplated, particular care may need to be taken, a different outcome 
may result. 
Methodological background 
Research Objectives 
Although there are clearly large, but in general segregated, bodies of literature on 
managerial characteristics, groups, the management of change, and staffing practices, there 
has been very little research which attempts to integrate these fields and examine how 
particular attributes of managers contribute to organisational performance under particular 
-.. ‘. circumstances. The objective of this research therefore has been to understand and explain 
how the attributes of new managers influenced the implementation of an organisation’s 
strategy at the time when it was attempting to achieve a significant change of direction. 
The aim was to understand, and explore the issues which managers themselves viewed as 
important, and which they believed had influenced the effectiveness of their company, and 
to learn from the understanding and experiences of the managers themselves. 
The nature of this question, and the desire to incorporate the complexity of a whole 
organisation, led to the choice of an interpretative study of a complete management team. 
a. 
. . . I_ 
Methodology 
‘The methodology selected was guided by the need to be able to cope with the complexity of 
: - :- organisational and economic contingencies, and surface the issues which were meaningful 
to the subjects themselves rather than the researcher. In addition, subjective matters such > I ,.I. 
as” relationships ’ and perceptions as to a colleague’s competence appeared to be 
inappropriate issues for the reductionist format of a questionnaire. As a result an interactive 
and interpretative methodology was chosen instead which examined a single organisation 
,,‘; ‘:I. from a-niulti%ource perspective. Given this framework, semi-structured interviews 
;, ‘.‘.i I : r - appeared. to offer *the .best ~op$ntunity of. exploring the core issues of interest to the 
researcher, which was how particular managerial attributes were perceived to have 
contributed to the organisation’s performance, whilst allowing the flexibility for additional 
aspects which were particularly important to the managers themselves to emerge. Certain 
information was obtained from all interviewees. This was:- a) personal details, including 
qualifications and work background; b) the interviewee’s understanding of the 
organisation’s strategic position, and if or how this had changed recently, and their role in 
contributing to this; c) the interviewee’s understanding of who had been successful within 
the company and why, and vice versa; d) how the interviewee would go about obtaining 
and managing the type of person he or she believed would contribute to the organisation’s 
success; and e) how the interviewee would deal with problem staff. In time, as particular 
people and particular situations emerged as especially important, these were explored in 
more detail. 
Thirty managers from the main subject company were interviewed between November 1992 
- July 1993, and contact has been maintained with several managers since that time. These 
individuals represented all the senior managers of the company. All the interviews were 
taped and transcribed. The interview data were supplemented by direct observation, as all 
meetings took place in the interviewees offices, and by documents, such as personnel 
records, in-house communications, and company reports and accounts, both internal and 
published. These data, in addition to data from the pilot study companies, were analysed 
and theoretical propositions derived by means of Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) model of 
grounded theory development. 
Organisation background 
The company chosen, a British PLC, was selected because it had a comparatively 
straightforward organisation and ownership structure; it had a fairly conventional hierarchy 
of supervisors, middle and senior managers, and top team of directors, and it was in public 
ownership. The company had an average of about one thousand employees at the time of. 
’ the research. In addition, it offered the opportunity to evaluate a programme of strategic 
.: change at the time it was happening, although one draw-back to this was that the 
performance ,outcome of the company was uncertain at the time of data-collection. The 
,company ‘had an unstable recent history. This included a merger with another equally- 
: ‘siied’company by which means the product ranges of both companies were intended to be 
7 complemented and extended. The company’s principal operations are the--supply and 
installation of environmental quality-maintenance equipment which are sold mainly into ;. 
‘the’& con&i&n and manufacturing industries. 
f ::::.: 
More precise details cannot be given as 
they would identify the company which wishes to remain anonymous. ,A.lthough its sales 
are mainly UK based, it had a small number of operations abroad and has expanded into the 
former communist countries of Eastern Europe. Sales of most products are through a 
national network of depots. 
.- 
In addition to the problems of the merger, many of the company’s old products were 
believed to have reached the end of their life-cycles and had ceased to be appropriate for 
the new types of factories or offices which were being built. Over recent years replacement 
products had not been developed in enough time to compensate for their decline. A 
widespread belief of the managers interviewed that both the old companies independently 
would have struggled to compete during the early 199Os, even without the added 
complication of the merger. These problems were exacerbated by the severe economic 
recession which affected the markets in which the company operated. Virtually all 
commercial organisations within the construction and manufacturing industries suffered, 
and companies servicing these sectors, as the subject company did, were particularly badly 
affected. 
As a.result of perceived poor management decisions at the end of the 198Os, relating to the 
merger and the immediate post-merger period, the company had brought in a new chief 
executive. He had instigated a major programme of change across the whole organisation. 
Since’his arrival he had instigated modifications to the company’s structure, systems and 
strategy. He had also -made new appointments to the positions of marketing, human 
resources, and operations directors, and had replaced a large number of other managers. At 
the start of the research period he was expressing the view that the company was now in a 
position to go forward, and was adopting objectives of growth through product and market 
development. These were to be measured in terms of profits, turnover and market 
positioning. The firm’s relative performance proved impossible to judge and making 
comparisons was not feasible. No other firm operated in exactly the same range of markets 
or was affected by the same circumstances, a point made forcibly by McDonald (1982), , 
who states that all organisations are unique. Nevertheless, in order to provide some 
comparative data, grouped figures are provided from other companies in similar markets 
(figure .2). I , 
- ,. .. Inseit figure 2 about here 
- However, most of the managers interviewed felt that the company had not done as well as it 
- ., : should: have done, and internal factors contributed to its poor performance. These are the 
subject of the discussion below. : 
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Development of grounded theory categories 
In the very precise way laid out by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and particularly by Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) conceptual categories were developed, and linkages between the 
categories and the context under which such categories or linkages occurred were 
identified. This was done by means of a coding paradigm in which the conditions, context, 
strategies and actions undertaken in relation to the category, and resulting consequences 
were stated. Hence it was possible to establish the situation in which a particular 
managerial attribute or behaviour was effective; the context in which it was found, the 
ways in which managers or the company encouraged its use, and the consequences of its 
presence’or absence. This process was undertaken on each category in turn and theoretical 
propositions developed. 
The process of labelling categories began at an early stage in data collection, during which 
ideas about phenomena were developed. An initial analysis of the data yielded over 1500 
categories. Over time, some of these began to emerge as more significant than others. 
These were then refined in an iterative process; some categories were discarded, and others 
re-defined, a ‘process which Glaser and Strauss term saturation. This resulted in a total of 
forty categories hnd.category groups (figure 3). 
_. ._ _-. 
Insert figure 3 about here 
A number of these categories were more central to the developing theory than others, and 
relationships between them were often highly complex. For example ruthlessness was not 
only a tielpful behaviour in its own right leading to control, it was also an important factor . . 
in the relationshiIjs and coalitions category. Shared values concerning ruthlessness 
influe’nced the acceptability of the individual to his or her colleagues within the specific 
context of this organisation. This in its turn impacted on team development, all of which 
related to the. organisation’s effectiveness category. The staffing category group also 
-emerged as an important one, which was linked to many others, and which highlighted the 
effects of the numbers of changes to staff which had taken place in the company recently. 
Recruitment related to learning curves and transferability of experience, and thus to the , . 
competence and credibility categories. . ,:; Another important relationship was that between \ 
7 ’ recruitrrrent? comfietence, dismissal and ruthlessness, an important attribute when the :._ , ,.-‘. 
previous*‘ex&&&e’ of new recruits appeared not to be easily transferable. This was 
, .;:.‘: -. .; , .-. iiLaz., 
perceived to be a major contributory factor to the firm’s poor performance, particularly 
when such staff were allowed to remain in key roles. 
-- 
It is a basic requirement of this methodology that single illustrations of phenomena are not 
accepted as theoretically significant; instead multiple examples have to be provided before 
a category can be considered meaningful. Negative cases are deliberately sought, in order 
to clarify and refine the central concepts of the category and to specify exceptions or 
contexts which might influence it. By these means, it is possible to specify the situations 
under which phenomena exist, a process which Glaser and Strauss term a conditional path. 
Theoretical propositions derived by such means can be posited to apply to other situations 
in which similar conditions are found and generalisability can thus be extended to a greater 
degree than in more conventional qualitative methodologies. However, the construction of 
such propositions, as with any research within the interpretivist persepective, can be 
considered no more than a personal, albeit empirically-derived, explanation of the 
circumstances as described by the managers themselves. 
Summary of data 
This section summarises the relevant case sttldy data. No attempt is made to integrate this 
with findings from previous research at this stage; instead this is carried out in the -- 
subsequent section. 
One of the contingencies underlying this company was a highly unsettled situation resulting 
from poor management prior to the arrival of the present senior management team. The 
previous directors were almost unanimously perceived to have failed to deal adequately 
with the integration of the merger several years previously, or to clearly define the strategic 
direction that the company should take. The circumstances facing the new team as a result 
were a disaffected, highly political staff, little consensus as to the company’s future, 
considerable strategic uncertainty and high levels of anxiety throughout the organisation. 
Given this background, a major cultural and strategic change programme was considered 
necessary to remedy these problems. Much’of this had been achieved prior to this study 
commencing. In this process a large number of managers had been dismissed, and 
replacements brought in from other companies including a high proportion from the chief 
. 
executive’s former company. New mana&rs were considered to be a major lever with 
which to effect change by the chief executive:- 
. ’ “Its a case of talent spotting, getting the right top team in 
_ .-: “. :. : i :place, getting key managers on-board. ,Now that again results . . . . . . 
in what I call the pecking order being altered and all sorts of 
sub-systems and values being tackled.” 
This view accords with those who suggest that increased innovation, fresh ideas, greater 
creativity and a general orientation towards growth and development will result from new 
management blood. In the case company, these views find mixed support. Some new 
managers certainly brought about change; the chief executive and human resources director 
had successfully.implemented new structures and systems and were adopting an innovative 
strategic posture. However, a considerable proportion of new managers were perceived to 
have failed to successfully contribute to the company’s performance. This resulted from 
several apparent mechanisms:- lack of competence due to inexperience and the 
unpredictability of recruitment; lack of common values with those already existing in the 
company; lack of time for co-operative relationships to have developed; and the need for 
particular competences given these specific contingencies. These four aspects emerged as 
key categories from analysis of the data and were central to a number of conditional paths 
or relationships between categories, and are dealt with below. 
,_‘. .  .  
a) Experience aud resulting competence 
As a result of the perceptions of the new chief-executive as to the quality of existing staff in 
the company, he had made a number of key managerial appointments. Many of these he 
had known of, or known personally in the past as they were colleagues from his former 
company. Although there were different views as to his motives for these appointments, 
such as the need to surround himself with trusted acolytes, others supported his own stated 
motives which were to bring in high quality people with previously successful track 
records. Despite these good intentions many of these appointments were unsuccessful. 
Lack of competence in those making the selection decisions, or a simple reflection of a _ 
normal failure rate in recruitment were both stated as potential explanations Some 
managers were aware of this problem:- 
“lf you’ve got -someone on board and in honesty feeling that 
’ you’ve gotthe right person for the job, its only tihen you get 
.them’ in the damned position that you really find out what 
‘. . . ..- .‘. .th&y’re’Bke.f!‘. Y.. ‘.: .. ‘. 
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r,:: . . Others, and this included the chief executive, appeared less aware of this.potential problem _ 
,. ., and .,a large number. of new .appointments were made. Many managers thought that this 
,, ,a’ . . ,‘_ problem ,a@ied .at .the most ,se,nior levels 
.,. 
. .-The lack of industry,knowledge of the chief 
executive, and at least two of his fellow directors, was widely believed to have contributed 
to what many believed to be fundamental strategic mistakes. One of these was the decision 
to persist with a policy of making staff generalists across all product groups. The 
company’s main products were in their own distinct markets, and sales and maintenance 
procedures were carried out in very different ways:- 
“He came from an operation that sold boxes, it was moving 
boxes around. Our business is a very different animal and this 
is the thing that they were all caught by.” 
The finance director was also comparatively new to the company, although he believed that 
his skills were transferable across industries. By no means everyone agreed with this, and 
he had been criticised along with the chief executive for his lack of product and industry 
knowledge. For example, his lack of experience of the specific sales techniques of the 
company, which relied heavily on local knowledge and individually negotiated deals, was 
seen to have contributed to his insistence on centrally-controlled and rigid profitability 
levels. Field managers felt that this had undermined their ability to respond to individual 
custo.mer need, and sales had been lost. In support of their views that these policies had 
been unhelpful, managers cited the fact that such policies had eventually been returned to 
their original positions. In the meantime, the company’s performance suffered. 
Lack of experience appeared to be crucial in other key roles too, for example marketing. 
Two senior executives in this area, including the director, were also new to the company. 
In addition to advertising and branding decisions which were widely criticised on the basis 
of their inappropriateness for the company’s market characteristics, the marketing director’s 
‘lack of experience appeared to affect his ability to assess the perfomlance of staff within his 
control:- 
“He had got a couple of guys over there, neither of them were 
very good and have since been removed or relocated, and he 
hadn’t got enough experience or knowledge himself of the 
I. : product to decide which one of them right so no decisions 
. were ever made and the few that were made were wrongs. ” 
As many of those with least experience of the organisation and its products were in key 
, 
% roles, their <previous experience in industries with very different characteristics appeared to 
:. . i ’ lead to decisions which were critical to the organisation’s performance and which were 
::. ; ,.subsequently heavily .criticised by those with more -experience within the company. The 
.;.- . * s .._. lack -of knowledge of the company’s characteristics on the part of the chief executive 
! i. _ 4: .. *-’ .’ -appeared’ in itself to .have .‘contributed to the decision to bring in a large number of 
executive, and at least two of his fellow directors, was widely believed to have contributed 
to what many believed to be fundamental strategic mistakes. One of these was the decision 
to persist with a policy of making staff generalists across all product groups. The 
company’s main products were in their own distinct markets, and sales and maintenance 
procedures were carried out in very different ways:- 
“He came from an operation that sold boxes, it was moving 
boxes around. Our business is a very different animal and this 
is the thing that they were all caught by.” 
The finance director was also comparatively new to the company, although he believed that 
his skills were transferable across industries. By no means everyone agreed with this, and 
he had been criticised along with the chief executive for his lack of product and industry 
knowledge. For example, his lack of experience of the specific sales techniques of the 
company, which relied heavily on local knowledge and individually negotiated deals, was 
seen to have contributed to his insistence on centrally-controlled and rigid profitability 
levels. Field managers felt that this had undermined their ability to respond to individual 
customer need, and sales had been lost. In support of their views that these policies had 
been unhelpful, managers cited the fact that such policies had eventually been returned to 
their original positions. In the meantime, the company’s performance suffered. 
Lack of experience appeared to be crucial in other key roles too, for example marketing. 
Two senior executives in this area, including the director, were also new to the company. 
In addition to advertising and branding decisions which were widely criticised on the basis 
of their inappropriateness for the company’s market characteristics, the marketing director’s 
lack of experience appeared to affect his ability to assess the performance of staff within his 
control:- 
“He had got a couple of guys over there, neither of them were 
very good and have since been removed or relocated, and he 
hadn’t got enough experience or knowledge himself of the 
product to decide which one of them right so no decisions 
were ever made and the few that were made were wrongs. ” 
As many of those with least experience of the organisation and its products were in key 
roles, their previous experience in industries with very different characteristics appeared to 
lead to decisions which were critical to the organisation’s performance and which were 
subsequently heavily criticised by those with more experience within the company. The 
lack of knowledge of the company’s characteristics on the part of the chief executive 
appeared in itself to have contributed to the decision to bring in a large number of 
newcomers. One manager who was generally supportive nevertheless felt that the lack of 
experience had been a problem:- 
“He took a lot of the expertise out. 1 think it was done before 
he spent enough time to understand what the function of these 
people actually was, and what happened was a hell of a lot of 
experienced people were removed in key positions.” 
This therefore highlights the paradox of new management and new experience being able to 
introduce change, whilst at the same time lacking the industry-specific knowledge which 
would make such change appropriate. 
b) Common values 
One of the reasons why there had been a large number of changes to staff was because of 
the perceived quality of the existing staff. Many were seen to be locked into inefficient or 
old-fashioned ways of working. Others appeared to be still at war with staff from the other 
side of the merged company a problem which the previous management had conspicuously 
failed to deal with. In an attempt to impose a new common purpose, and unite the disparate 
factions, those who were unwilling or unable to accept the changes were removed. 
Although competence was certainly a consideration in making staffing decisions, “fit” 
appeared to be emphasised more. Many of those who were dismissed or made redundant 
left because they had the wrong attitudes or values given the new direction that the 
company wished to take. However, the choice of selecting people principally for “fit” again 
had unhelpful consequences in terms of loss of product and market knowledge. 
“,4 lot of the people who were chosen for redundancy actually 
went because they had the wrong attitudes but we threw out 
the baby with the bath water. We lost a lot of people with 
experience and skills.” 
One source of people with known common values were those with whom the chief 
executive had worked in the past, and a large proportion of the new management 
appointments, including the marketing director, came from his previous company. As 
suggested above, this was in part because they had a known track record, however, this 
policy also ensured that he was surrounded by people that he knew he could trust. Given 
the politics and lack of team spirit in the company that he inherited, this was seen by some 
to be an understandable response. However, it became problematic:- 
w_., . . - - - - - - .  ._. - .  
“T h e r e  was  a  h u g e  wave  o f res is tance to  n e w c o m e r s . 
Jea lousy  in  my  view. I’ve  s e e n  it b e fo r e , but  n o t to  such  a  
savage  d e g r e e  h e r e  actual ly.” 
O thers  th o u g h t th a t th is  res is tance was  justif iecl:- 
“I d o n ’t know  but  they  al l  c a m e  o n  b o a r d  a t a  r ime  w h e n  th e  
n u m b e r  o f e m p l o y e e s  shou ld  ha i :e  b e e n  dec reas ing  a n d  the re  
we re  p e o p l e  c o m i n g  in  a n d  the re  was  q u e s tio n s  asked  wel l  
why  d id  h e  n e e d  th a t pe rson  to  d o  th is  par t icu lar  job.” 
M a n y  o f th e s e  recrui ts we re  be l i eved  to  b e  less c o m p e te n t th a n  th o s e  th e y  h a d  rep laced.  A s  
a  resul t  o f this, a n d  th e  a p p a r e n t re luc tance o f th e  chief  execu tive to  dea l  wi th h is  fo rmer  
co l l eagues  w h o  we re  n o t as  c o m p e te n t as  th e y  n e e d e d  to  be,  th is  coal i t ion was  s e e n  to  b e  a  
fa v o u r e d  sub -g roup  in  wh ich  poo r  pe r fo rmance  was  n o t dea l t wi th in  th e  s a m e  way  as  in  
o the r  cases.  Resis tance to  th e  n e w c o m e r s  bui l t  u p , a n d  p ressu re  was  b r o u g h t to  bea r  to  
h a v e  m a n y  o f th e m  r e m o v e d , a d d i n g  to  th e  instabi l i ty wh ich  h a d  charac ter ised th e  c o m p a n y  
over  recent  tim e s . 
c) d is rupt ions to  re la t ionsh ips  
O n e  resul t  o f th e  staff ing c h a n g e s  was  th e  b reak ing  o f ex is t ing a n d  wel l -es tab l ished 
re lat ionships,  a n d  th e  tim e  ta k e n  fo r  trust a n d  l ik ing to  bu i ld  u p  b e fo re  n e w  o n e s  cou ld  b e  
e ffe ’ctive:- 
“It’s a lso  inev i tab le  th a t w h e n  y o u  m o v e  into a  di f ferent o ffice 
o r  a  di f ferent e n v i r o n m e n t th e n  it takes  tim e  to  bu i ld  your  
te a m  u p  to  g e t th e  te a m  to  unde rs ta n d  h o w  y o u  work,  h o w  y o u  
w a n t th e m  to  work,  w h a t work  y o u  expec t th e m  to  d o . It d o e s  
ta k e  tim e  to  bu i ld  it a n d  trust very  o fte n  on ly  c o m e s  wi th tim e . 
Y o u  d o n ’t trust s o m e b o d y  st ra ightaway.” 
Th is  n e e d  to  bu i ld  te a m s  a n d  deve lop  trust app l i ed  a t th e  m o s t sen io r  level .  T h e  chief  
execu tive, o n  h is  arr iva l  in  th e  c o m p a n y , d id  n o t h a v e  a n  ex is t ing te a m  a r o u n d  h i m . H e  h a d  
inher i ted  a  n u m b e r  o f sen io r  m a n a g e r s , n o n e  o f w h o m  h e  h a d  k n o w n  prev ious ly  a n d  n o n e  o f 
w h o m  h a d  b e e n  a p p o i n te d  by  h i m . O n  arr ival  h e  h a d  m a d e  e fforts to  bu i ld  a r o u n d  h i m  a  
sen io r  m a n a g e m e n t te a m  wi th th e  ski l ls a n d  character ist ics wh ich  h e  be l i eved  we re  
necessary  a t th e  tim e . Howeve r , wi th on ly  th e  ma rke tin g  d i rector  d id  th e  chief  execu tive 
h a v e  a  pr ior  re la t ionsh ip  o n  wh ich  m u tua l  trust cou ld  b e  b a s e d . A s  th is  ind iv idua l  was  a t 
the centre of subsequent criticisms for his lack of experience and resulting competence, this 
relationship proved problematic. Overall, the new top team in itself had no established 
sense of common purpose, or ability to discuss difficult or contentious issues within a basic 
framework of trust. This affected the chief executive’s ability to hear criticisms of the 
performance of his colleague, and therefore take action on him. 
The ability to deal with less than competent staff was another problem which resulted from 
the new managerial appointments. In recent times a consi’derable proportion of managers 
were making fresh assessments about the strengths and weaknesses of their own staff. This 
resulted in delays to problem people being dealt with:- 
“Anyway what happened then is, he would have gone before 
now but things change. My opposite number in the south 
went, the structure changed and the areas were created, 
Martin was promoted to area manager. 1 flagged up my 
concerns to Martin about Tim and he said “I don’t want to 
know I’ll form my own opinion” which is fine, it’s as it should 
be.” 
However, this resulted in problem members of staff remaining in place longer than if the 
managerial relationship had not been disrupted. If such individuals were in key roles, such 
as the product development managers, sales and profits were lost throughout the whole 
company. Product divisions were responsible for new product development, and also for 
training and support functions, such as the repair of existing products. Logistics problems 
in the supply of parts or complete products to the depots as a result of the low standards of 
these managers meant that sales were lost, or quality of service was lower than expected. 
Communication channels between those who were aware of customer needs and those 
responsible for product development was blocked, and real innovative activity in these 
product divisions was also blocked. 
In addition, disruptions to relationships had also affected the company’s commercial 
performance in a number of other ways. Knowledge of customer requirements, in-house 
communications channels and other systems, and the sharing of ideas about product 
applications had all been damaged whilst new relationships took time to develop. Co- 
operation across depots had also been a problem affecting stock usage and customer service 
levels, a situation which had only recently been resolved:- 
“I think there were a lot of cases where depots were working 
against each other at times. They wouldn’t let a product go 
because they might need it tomorrow. But the relationship of 
the area managers together has been lifted. We all know 
we’re on a common course. If I’m sitting in the same room as 
Steve and I’m in trouble on this call, he’ll help me out. I’ll say 
yes, by all means because 1 know the problem and the 
situation he’s in and know if its the other way round, 1 could 
rely on him to help me out.” 
d) Contingent behaviours 
It was apparent from this case that managers and staff within an organisation have to be 
acceptable to colleagues; liking or at least respect for other organisation members impacts 
on the trust that has to exist if strategy is to be achieved co-operatively. The newcomers, 
and particularly those from the chief executive’s former company, that were able to 
overcome the problems of lack of trust appeared to be extremely sensitive to this issue. In 
order to overcome resentment of them they openly demonstrated their commitment to their 
new colleagues by challenging the chief executive, and were careful to avoid abusing their 
apparently privileged position. Those newcomers that were accepted also demonstrated an 
ability to listen and learn without assuming they already “knew it all”. An example of 
where this did not occur was the marketing director:- - 
“He tended to speak down to people which is no use, not in a 
team situation.” 
This problem was variously explained as shyness, lack of confidence, innate arrogance, or 
poor communication ability, however, the outcome of his behaviour was that people 
stopped co-operating with him. A common belief was that the marketing expertise within 
the’organisation was not used adequately, and branding, advertising, and pricing strategies 
were poorly implemented. 
Another problematic behaviour in the circumstances of the time concerned the ability of 
managers to face up to others. Again, the marketing director and other new managers were 
seen as lacking in this area. The role which the marketing director had taken on, which not 
only encompassed marketing strategy, but also the management of product development 
and the interface between these and the sales network, was believed to be far too much for 
one person to cope with. It was believed that he had been unable to resist the pressure he 
was put under to take on such a wide range of responsibilities, although inexperience which 
blocked the realisation of the enormity of these tasks also appeared to play a part in this. 
- 
However, this inability to face up to pcoplc M’;IS ;I problem in other ways tO0. The 
marketing director was said to ha\:e failccl IO clcal with two problenr people, both employed 
in important roles. This was a criticism which ws also le\~clled against other less 
successful new managers, including the cllicf executive who was seen to be resistant to 
personally dealing with his less compctcnt former colleagues, particularly the marketing 
director. The general unpredictability of recruitment had led to comparatively high 
numbers of less -than competent individuclls being in post. This was exacerbated by the 
economic environment which required a consiclerablc reduction in staff numbers. Under 
these circumstances, understanding the need to put the organisation before the needs of the 
individual meant that a certain ruthless disregard for the person was the result, which 
appeared beneficial in performance terms. The removal of ineffective staff who not only 
failed to carry out their own work but also hindcl-cd others from carrying out theirs, was an 
important part of team management, and was particularly crucial in senior roles. 
There were a number of underlying factors which contributed to this behaviour or its 
absence, for example, sensitivity to others’ feelings appeared not to be a helpful 
characteristic. One of the new managers who MS well-regarded deliberately kept personal 
feelings out of the process of staffing decisions:- 
“You see, I’m not someone who gets close tomy people, to be 
honest. Fairly close, but 1 always like to keep a distances” 
This was aided by the separation of work and personal relationships, allowing the 
emotional detachment necessary to take difficult and stressful personal decisions. 
The number of prior relationships, particularly imolving the chief executive and his 
former colleagues, appeared to inhibit the :Ibility to take such difficult personal 
decisions. 
Discussion and development of theoretical propositions, and areas where 
previous research is confirmed, rejected, or extended 
The contextual environment of this company was an organisation which had experienced 
considerable change over recent years and which was beset by strategic uncertainty. A new 
chief executive had been appointed to “normalise” the company. His perceptions were that 
the quality of many of the staff that he inherited was inadequate for the future success of the 
company. This provided him with a number of problems:- a) what to do with staff who 
were unwilling or unable to accept the new management and strategic direction and thus 
were disruptive, but at the same time had necessary product or industry expertise; and b), 
how to increase the levels of competence of those responsible for developing product or 
marketing opportunities within the company. It could be argued that this situation was a 
no-win one. Keeping existing staff would perpetuate the low standards and would allow 
those individuals who were not supportive of the changes. to perpetuate the strategic and 
cultural mistakes of recent times. On the other hand, dismissing these individuals and 
replacing them with higher quality staff recruited externally would remove the core 
expertise and experience which any organisation needs and which would not be 
immediately available from other sources. 
This dilemma find support in previous theory, and is a paradox which has also been 
identified by Pfeffer:- “Ironically, the politics of succession that make change more likely 
with an outsider . . . . also make the choice of an outsider more problematic and resistance to 
the new outsider executive more intense” Pfeffer (1981 p 266). There are said to be 
considerable benefits of bringing new “blood” into an organisation. Past experience 
influences present decisions and behaviour (Pettigrew 1991), thus people with different 
experiences can introduce change because they bring with them different expectations and 
experiences and are not bound by. the existing cultural and group beliefs and values. 
Guthrie and Olian (1991) Sathe 1989, Allcom 1990, and Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) 
suggest that individuals with extra-organisational experience, who can bring new ideas, can 
be particularly effective in conditions of uncertainty such as changing economic or 
industrial circumstances. Similarly, where innovation is needed; Chaganti and Sambharya 
(1987) found that “prospector” companies had the highest level of outsiders in managerial 
roles. 
On the other hand, Szilagyi and Schweiger (1984) suggest that a market growth strategy 
requires executives to have extensive external contacts and considerable knowledge of their 
industry. This was supported by Gupta (1986), who suggested that there are well- 
established associations between greater indusrry familiarity, and build or harvest strategies 
and Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) who found that lack of core expertise was linked with 
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the subsequent failure of the firm. Kotter (19S2) and T innnons (1989) s imilarly  found that 
successfu l managers or entrepreneurs were highly  cxpcr ienced and knowledgeable about 
their company or indus try and their specialis t knowledge was transferable to new s ituations  
only  with difficu lty . 
Although most people felt that the chief executi\fe had achieved a great deal which had not 
been tac k led prior to his  arrival, Kotter’s  \‘icw  that managerial s k ills  are not easily  
transferable into new contexts found considcrablc  support in this  company. In an attempt to 
bring in people that he knew had successfu l t rack records, the chief executive had recruited 
a large number of managers from his  previous  firm. At one point, this  group had comprised 
some 15 indiv iduals , or 20% of the senior managers of the time. However, a large 
proportion of these were believed by their new colleagues  to be les s  than competent, and 
they were eventually removed - leav ing only  four remaining. 
Inexperience was a key  element in their lac k  of competence. Their knowledge of the 
indus try and product characteris tic s  of the new company was inadequate, compounded by 
lac k  of knowledge of their co lleagues  or both formal and informal organisational s y s tems, 
both of which s lowed down appropriate action being taken. In addition, it was believed that 
lac k  of specific  experience on the part of the chief executive and other direc tors had led to 
inappropriate decis ions  being taken relating-to the organisation’s  s trategic  objec tives  and 
s tructure, as well as s taffing. Expectations that the company’s  indus try and market 
characteris tic s  were the same as his  former company exacerbated these problems, a 
phenomenon which appeared to be encouraged by the “s trength in numbers” (Tjosvo ld 
1991) support he received from some of his  former colleagues  who shared s imilarly  
mis taken beliefs . 
The his tory, c ircumstances, and effec ts  of the polic y  of importing new s taff in order to bring 
about change as descr ibed above, is  shown in figure 4. This  conditional path graphically 
represents the sequence of events, and indicates linkages and consequences of this  polic y , 
as they could be traced within the subject company. 
Insert figure 4 about here 
G iven the perceived need to increase the quality  of ex is ting s taff and change the company’s  
direc tion, this  model illus trates the dilemma fac ing those attempting to introduce change. 
Retaining ex is ting s taff would have perpetuated the IoW  s tandards and allowed 
inappropriate polic ies  and beliefs  to persis t. In addition it would have allowed those 
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indiv iduals  who were disr-upti\.e or incompetent to affec t performance by bloc k ing 
communication between organisation sect ions , and preventing co-operation within the 
depots. On the other hand, dismis s ing these indi\~iduals  and replacing them with higher 
quality  s taff recruited esternally would rcmo\~c thc s c  com~~~unicatio~~ and relationship 
networks, and would ris k  importing pcoplc  who would not be acceptable to ex is ting s taff by 
dint of their very  different ways of \Ticwing the world and their challenging of the s tatus  
quo. However, in this  case, it appears that the ~‘ery different nature of the indus try 
characteris tic s  incrcascd the problems. Althou~l~ rhis  would not have overcome the 
difficu lty  a new manager is  like ly  to cspcr icncc  in not knowing the organisation’s  ex is ting 
s y s tems or power relationships  (Mintzbcrg 1983), if the newcomers had come from a 
company with greater product or market s imilarities , change may have been introduced 
which was based on a truer understanding of the market and product characteris tic s  and 
would therefore have had a greater chance of acceptance. 
Another aspect of this  dilemma concerned the resis tance of ex is ting s taff to newcomers 
with different ways of v iewing the world. This  problem is  reflec ted to some extent in the 
literature on the performance of homogeneous or heterogeneous groups. Although there has 
been some inconsis tency of results  (Petrigrcw 1992), in general cu lturally  or 
demographically heterogeneous groups are said to be more effec tive in unstable or dynamic  
environments; homogeneous ones in s table environments (Priem 1990). Homogeneity of 
va lues  has been les s  researched, no doubt in part because of the contentious and difficu lt 
nature of their definition or measurement (McDonald and Gandz 1992). Hambrick and 
Brandon (1988) c laim that it has not yet been established whether organisational 
performance is  helped or hurt by homogenous \*slues within a management team. They 
suggest that “there is  some evidence that c x tremc homogeneity of va lues  helps  
organisational performance by creating a unity  of v is ion and smoothing communication. 
However, ev idence also ex is ts  that homogcneiry hurts performance by severely  restricting 
information processing capabilities .” 
In the case company this  commonality  was fragmented, and homogeneity, both of va lues  
and demographic background, appeared to be both a hindrance and a help. Homogeneous 
beliefs  appeared to be a necessary condition for the development of trusting relationships , 
given the extreme turbulence of the company’s  internal and external environment at the 
time. The decis ion to recruit a number of people from the same background is  an indicator 
of the perceived need to impose a common way of v iewing the world and work within a 
framework of trust. However, the homogeneity of background of this  group gave problems, 
as it appeared to blinker its  members from hearing dissenting outside opinions , and 
encouraged the continuation of mis taken beliefs  concerning s trategy and s tructure because 
of their failure to understand the very  different product characteris tic s  of the two firms . 
- -  -  _ _ _  - -__e-  
,a  
This  g r o u p  sub-cu l ture  a lso  p rov ided  a  c o m m o n  “e n e m y ” or  s c a p e g o a t th a t po la r i sed  th e  
la rger  m a n a g e m e n t te a m  a n d  b locked  c o m m u n i c a tio n  a n d  co-opera t ion  ( B e tte n h a u s e n  
1 9 9 1 ) . Those  ind iv idua ls  w h o  h a d  pr ior  re la t ionsh ips  c a u s e d  p rob lems  by  th e  very  fact  th a t 
th e y  we re  s e e n  to  b e  a  sepa ra te  g r o u p , wi th sepa ra te  va lues  a n d  bel ie fs  a n d  sepa ra te  
p r iv i leged chamle ls  o f c o m m u n i c a tio n . 
Hambr i ck  a n d  B r a n d o n  (1988 )  suggest  a  way  o f ove rcom ing  th e  p rob lems  o f 
a c c o m m o d a tin g  di f ferent ways  o f \,ie w i n g . th e  wor ld  m a y  b e  th e  se lect ion o f ind iv idua ls  
wi th c o m m o n  va lues,  but  dif ferent cogni t ive  exper iences .  In  th e  sub ject  c o m p a n y , desp i te  
th e  p o te n tia l ly  b e n e ficial e ffects o f th e  d e m o g r a p h i c  h e te rogene i ty o f th e  to p  te a m , ma jo r  
d i s a g r e e m e n ts over  po l ic ies  a n d  strategy e m e r g e d , a n d  ra ther  th a n  th is  l ead ing  to  a  
suf f ic iency o f i deas  a n d  solut ions,  it l ed  to  c o n flict, lack o f clari ty th r o u g h o u t th e  
organ isat ion,  a n d  e v e n tua l ly  to  th e  d is in tegrat ion o f th e  to p  te a m . J o h n s o n  p rov ides  o n e  
answer  to  th is  d i l e m m a  a n d  s u g g e s ts th a t a l t hough  the re , arc  l ikely to  b e  di f fer ing v iews 
wi th in a n  organ isat ion,  a t s o m e  leve l  the re  h a s  to  b e  a  d c & c  o f c o m m o n a l i ty:- “W h ilst 
ind iv idua l  m a n a g e r s  m a y  ho ld  qu i te  vc l ry ing sets o f be l ie fs  a b o u t m a n y  di f ferent aspec ts o f 
th a t o rgan isa t iona l  wor ld ,  the re  is l ikely to  esist  a t son ic  leve l  a  co re  set o f be l ie fs  a n d  
a s s u m p tio n s  he ld  re lat ively c o m m o n l y  by  th e  m a n a g e r s ”, in  o the r  words  th e  p a r a d i g m , o r  
cu l ture ( Johnson  1 9 9 2 ) . Th is  was  consp icuous ly  lack ing  in  th is  case,  p e r h a p s  n o t 
surpr is ing ly  g i ven  th e  o rgan isa t ion’s history a n d  d e g r e e  o f c h a n g e  th a t it h a d  g o n e  th r o u g h . 
Howeve r , th e  pr ior  i den ti f icat ion o f c o m m o n a l i ty o n  key  factors, par t icu lar ly  th o s e  re la t ing 
to  th e  o rgan isa t ion’s strategy, m a y  h a v e  b e e n  a  u s e fu l  too l  in  sur fac ing a reas  o f p o te n tia l  
c o n flict wi th in th e  to p  te a m . Howeve r , as  yet, th is  c o n c e p t a p p e a r s  to  b e  a t a  very  ear ly  
s tage  o f d e v e l o p m e n t (McDona ld  a n d  G a n d z  1 9 9 1 , a n d  P r iem 1 9 9 0 ) . Cur rent  m o d e l s  ta k e  
n o  a c c o u n t o f d i f ferences in  va lues  th a t a re  l ikely to  exist  b e tween  di f ferent fu n c tiona l  a reas  
such  as  ma rke tin g  a n d  fin a n c e , a l t hough  Sz i lagy i  a n d  Schwe ige r  (1984 )  h a v e  n o te d  th e  
dif f icult ies in  m a n a g i n g  th e  bounda r i es  b e tween  such  di f ferent areas.  
. . 
In  th is  c o m p a n y , th e  shee r  n e w n e s s  o f th e  to p  te a m  a n d  th e  la rge  n u m b e r s  o f c h a n g e s  to  
o the r  m a n a g e r s  m a y  h a v e  c o n tr ibuted to  th e s e  p rob lems  a n d  h i nde red  th e  p rocesses  o f te a m  
d e v e l o p m e n t. Th is  p r o b l e m  is o n e  wh ich  h a s  a l ready  b e e n  i den tifie d  in  th e  case  o f h i gh  
g row th  c o m p a n i e s  (for e x a m p l e  Hambr i ck  a n d  Croz ier  1 9 8 5 )  in  th e  p r o b l e m  o f in tegrat ion 
a n d  accul tur isat ion o f l a rge  n u m b e r s  o f staff a t th e  s a m e  tim e . G iven  th is  fas t -chang ing  
a n d  tu rbu len t  e n v i r o n m e n t cer ta in  behav iou rs  we re  par t icu lar ly  important ,  exace rba ted  by  
th e  pe rcep tio n  th a t a  h i gh  p ropor t ion  o f n e w  m a n a g e r s  we re  “in  th e  pocke t” o f th e  chief  
execu tive. T h e  m a n a g e r s  f rom th is  g r o u p  th a t fo u n d  accep ta n c e  a p p e a r e d  to  b e  ex t remely  
sensi t ive to  th is  issue,  a  behav iou r  k n o w n  to  inc rease  th e  l ikely accep ta n c e  o f innovat ions  
(Howel l  a n d  H igg ins  1 9 9 0 ) , o r  c h a n g e  (K i r ton 1 9 8 4 ) . Successfu l ly  ass imi la ted m a n a g e r s  in  
th e  case  c o m p a n y  we re  carefu l  to  d e m o n s trate the i r  c o m m i tm e n t to  th e  n e w  organ isat ion,  
and show their independence by standing up to their fornrcr collcague. In addition, they 
showed sensitivity about their own lack of cspcricncc or l~~wlcdgc. As a result they were 
trusted, and accepted. Where such trust was l:icl;in~:, anal where the individual concerned 
was in a central role, the effect was belie\~ccl to bc critical to the performance of the 
company (figure 5). 
lnserl figure 5 about here 
One important contingent bcha\Tiour was the ability to confront others. Its impact related 
principally to the dismissal of poorly performing staff, but also to the taking and 
implementing of decisions, ” fighting” for what was believed to be right, and the gaining of 
respect and co-operation from staff. Self-confidence, which appeared to be a key 
underlying personality characteristic contributing to this behaviour, is identified within 
many of the managerial effecri\Teness or competence models (for example Campbell, 
Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick 1970; Elkin 1990). However, despite considerable anecdotal 
evidence about the ruthlessness of m:uly successful csccutives, it seems to have been 
subject to remarkably little empirical examinZtion, with the exception of those writers who 
identify the behaviours required to maintain power (for csample Pettigrew 1973; Kotter 
1982; Pfeffer 1982; and Mintzbcrg 1983). As dismissals are potentially extremely 
stressful and difficult processes, particularly where close colleagues are concerned, factors 
such as friendships or prior relationships and thus loyalties or the lack of ruthless 
detachment would make such decisions more difficult and act as a block to appropriate 
action being taken. 
In the case of the subject company the absence of this type of behaviour, particularly in key 
individuals such as the chief executive, the marketing director, and a number of other 
managers, all of whom were perceived to have failed to tackle problematic staff quickly, 
was believed to have considerable impact on the performance of the organisation, 
particularly given that the competence of many of the large numbers of new recruits was 
seen to be low. As a result their colleagues started “working round” problem individuals, 
thus blocking the efficient exchange of information and ideas. Problems in the supply and 
development of products escalated, leading to poor service quality, and the loss of 
commercial opportunities. The credibility of the manager was also reduced, leading in most 
cases to the eventual departure of the individual concerned and yet more disruption due to 
personnel changes. 
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However, the ability to make accurate asscssrncnts ;~OLI~ performance was blocked by a 
number of factors to do with the influs of new nlan:~~crs. In the first place it took time for 
those new managers who came from cliffcrcnt intlustrics to become aware of a colleague’s 
lack of competence; ;~ssess~ncnts about rhc rcc~uircrncrrrs of the role were based on 
mistaken assumptions. Similarl!~, 111~ rcnclc~~cs to yi\,c :I prc~blcm indi\~idual the benefit of 
the doubt, in the short term at ICM, also delayccl rhc taking of dismissal decisions. This 
process is shown in Figurc 6. 
insert ligure 6 abuur here 
Conclusion 
This paper has outlined some of the factors which influenced the assimilation and thus 
effectiveness of new managers within an organisation that was attempting to change its 
strategic position. It has highlighted the complexity of the effects which large numbers of 
inexperienced staff, and resulting lack of industry knowledge or competence have on 
strategic decisions and thus the pcrformaucc of the firm. It has also highlighted the need 
for commonality of values if new staff are to be accepted into the firm, and thereby form 
co-operative relationships, and the riced for specific bcha\siours in these circumstances if 
managers who are inadequate are not to remain and damage the organisation’s performance. 
Although generalisations have to be made with some care from this study, the nature of the 
grounded methodology, in which theoretical propositions are tested within the data itself, 
suggests that some aspects of these findings may be applicable to other managerial 
situations. For example, even though the specific organisational circumstances may be 
unique, managerial tasks are similar across many organisational types. The management of 
change is frequently attempted, and the appointment of new staff with the intention of 
introducing change is also known to occur. Given the apparent uncertainty surrounding 
recruitment, the removal of poor staff may also be an important and regular managerial 
task, although the very extreme degree of transition and turmoil experienced in this firm 
may not be common. Thus although it is acknowledged that generalisability cannot be the 
same as that generated by other, more yuantitati\*e methodologies, it is hoped that the 
findings from this study will add to our understanding of the complexity that is involved in 
managing change in organisations. 
..-.._ 
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